

NOVEMBER 1944

As Nov. dawned the 43d Third Army
was in preparation for the coming
breakthrough in the Saar.
The capture of the Saar-Moselle Triangle
AND TETTER, its major strategic
its sector would accomplish the goals
of the strategy: turn the flank of
the entire Siegfried line in the Third
Army's zone, and at the same time
cover the Trier-Koblenz direct
approach to the Rhine.

The cold, cloudy day of 1 Nov 44 began with a heavy frost which settled on the elements of US 30th Infantry Division whose line of defense extended from LESSELS on the NW to AJONCOURT in the SE along the bank of the SEILLE RIVER. The river was the next natural barrier which lay between the enemy and the units of the Division. CT 313 occupied the center of the Division sector from the town of MANONCOURT SUR SEILLE SE to FARM DE LA BORDE (S of the MONTIGNY PENINSULA). The 1st Bn, in Regimental Reserve, occupied the vicinity in and around LUXEMAS behind the 2d and 3d Bns. The latter were on a line from W to E with the 2d Bn occupying the left half of the Regimental sector from the rail-road junction E of MANONCOURT SUR SEILLE to HILL 208 (SE of CHIEBRY). The 3d Bn was in position SE of MONTIGNY in the vicinity of FARM DE LA BORDE along the S bank of the SEILLE RIVER. The activities of the Regiment for the month of November were to be concerned with the clearing of enemy troops from the area between the SEILLE RIVER and the SAAR RIVER in the LORRAINE SECTOR.

To the immediate front of the Division stood the lines of the German 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the 43th Infantry Division. Information obtained from interrogation of prisoners indicated the 3d Bn of the 30th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, ~~of the~~ 17th SS Panzer Division to be occupying defensive positions from CHEMINOT to EMY. The enemy 1431st Fortress Bn, under the tactical command of the 43th Infantry Division, occupied the position from ROUVES NE to EMY; the 2d Bn of the 127th Infantry Regiment of the same division occupied positions in the vicinity of AULNOIS. Supporting the 43th Infantry was the 1151st

Artillery Bn consisting of three batteries, each having three 105mm motorized howitzers, four light machine-guns and approximately 80 men. In addition to these, divisional organic artillery, the 148th Artillery Regiment - possessing nine batteries - was also attached. Of these units, the 1431st Fortress Bn and elements of the 126th Infantry Regiment were more directly in the path of CT 318. After action reports indicated that no German officer was authorized to issue a retreat order.

C. 14 Nov 44
The weather of 2 Nov 44 continued cloudy and cold after a frosty morning. The activities of CT 318^{IN THE CTR of the DIV zone,} were enveloped by the heavy frost which lasted through the early morning hours. All units of the Regiment remained in positions occupied the previous day. No change was noted in the disposition of the enemy forces and both sides engaged in aggressive patrolling. The situation and weather remained the same through 3 Nov 44. Little change occurred during the day-light hours of 4 Nov 44 and CT 318 continued to probe the enemy lines. Late in the night, the 1st Bn of CT 318 left its reserve positions in LIXIERES to relieve the 3d Bn in FARM DE LA BORDE, SE of NOMENY. The 3d Bn then reverted to Regimental reserve and ~~was~~ moved to LIXIERES. The 2d Bn remained in position in the vicinity of HILL 206 and MANONCOURT SUR SEILLE. The Regimental attack order rec'd at 1500.

← **6** pg 163 Nov 5

The first rains of the month began in the early morning hours of 6 Nov 44 and continued heavily throughout the day and night. The Regimental CP moved from SERRIERES to MANONCOURT late in the night. No other changes ~~was~~ occurred in the Regimental sector as the unit prepared for the offensive. The heavy rains continued on 7 Nov 44 while the US 80th Infantry made preparations to take part in the drive of the Third US Army to the E. Late in the night of 7 Nov 44 and through the early morning hours of 8 Nov 44, the SEILLE RIVER overflowed its banks. By morning, the town of

~~MANONCOURT SUR SEILLE WAS DESTROYED~~

CLEMERY was inundated with the flood waters of the SEILLE RIVER. The river became swift, swollen and debris-laden; the banks of the river were awash, and the rains continued without let-up. The objective of the 1st Bn was the high ground along MONTIGNY RIDGE and HILL 217 which over-looked MAILLY SUR SEILLE from the S. For its objective the 2d Bn was to secure the NOMENY-RAUCOURT highway (Rt 413) running N and S below the SEILLE RIVER. The 3d Bn remained behind the 2d Bn in reserve at LIXIERES.

On 8 Nov 44, after a 45 minute preparation was delivered into the area of the crossing site by Divisional artillery and twelve other artillery battalions, CT 318 moved northward toward the river.

The 1st Bn (CO:LCOL Tosi) move forward at 0530 and, upon reaching the near bank of the river, found that the men had to wade 100 yards into the muddy, waist-high waters to reach the assault boats. At this time enemy mortar and artillery fire opened up on the crossing site in the vicinity below CLEMERY. Enemy machine guns delivered a withering fire from the heights across the river. It was quite apparent that the artillery preparations earlier did not fully accomplish the desired effect. Crossing was accomplished under heavy automatic weapons and shelling.

On reaching the other side, ⁰⁶¹⁶ the forward elements of the battalion moved up the gap between ROUVES on the W flank and NOMENY on the E. Intense heavy machine gun fire was received which momentarily delayed the advance.

By 0740 a footbridge had been completed and the remainder of the battalion was completely across the river. Co A (CO:Lt Mahoney) received a severe concentration of machine-gun fire. Lt Mahoney crawled forward for about 200 yards to locate the enemy positions and, in doing so, was severely wounded in the arms and legs. Mahoney continued to locate enemy positions and to relay the information to the rear. Co A then continued forward

Firing 8 Nov
Bns MM
80 Div Art - 313 FA (105)
314 FA (105)
315 FA (155)
405 FA (105)
404 FA Group - 512 FA (105mm)
974 FA (155)
775 FA (155mm)
731 FA (8" howitzer)
62 PRND Div Art - 188 AFA (105 SP)
312 * (105 SP)
231 AFA (105 SP)
183 FA Group - 476 AFA (105 SP)
496 AFA (105 SP)
752 AFA (155 SP)
XII CORP ART - 741st FA (8" howitzer)
427 FA (240mm)
All AD BN - 90mm guns
888 TD BN (3" gun - forward)
ENGINEER 337, 318, 319
See BRONS Vol IV 14337 & F

Moving NE between Rouves
& Nomeny toward Hill 217
Enemy fighting with enemy positions
4th Pz Div in Hill 217. Enemy in
at 1000 in our possession after dark
(See Staff Page)

216

By 1645:
A Co 500 yds 129 Mainly
B Co 200 yds of Seille River
C Co on Hill 213. Repara
1000 yds 1830. e/a at
1830. 7 PM 10 Road to
Support

Sir Rec

toward the battalion objective. Co C (CO: Lt F. Williams) lost its commander and Lt Grady (Co Lx Off) assumed command when the company encountered heavy enemy mortar and automatic fire. Grady reorganized the company in time to beat off an enemy counter-attack and swiftly moved his men forward to over-run the enemy machine-gun emplacements. Heavy enemy artillery forced the company back from its gains, but Grady once again led the men over the same route to re-take the ground. As the enemy counter-attacked, striking at the rear of Co C (CO: Lt Grady), Lt Barker, mortar section leader, engaged an enemy force of 30 men. Killing the enemy too close to be halted by mortar fire, he then directed the fire of his mortar crews on those remaining. Within minutes the enemy attack was annihilated by the loss of 13 additional men killed and 15 wounded. Co D, in support, was similarly halted by an enemy emplacement containing four machine-gun crews. Crawling over 600 yards under fire, Lt Queenin (platoon leader) successfully captured the four guns without firing a shot.

Along road to 129

The battalion then continued forward to reach the foot of HILL 217. At this time a bitter fight ensued. An enemy counter-attack was broken up by our artillery leaving 17 enemy dead on the slopes. The 1st Bn then swarmed up the hill and dug in. By 1600 HILL 217 was secured and elements of the battalion could look down on the town of MAILLY SUR SEILLE. Late in the evening in the vicinity of the bridgehead, Pfc Monahan (Co D) was captured by an enemy patrol led by an English-speaking officer. Monahan, at gun-point, was instructed to lead the patrol into the American lines and to identify the enemy unit as an American patrol. On reaching a friendly road-block - and at the risk of his own life - Monahan called out to warn his men. A sharp fight ensued during which Monahan made his way to the road-block. Later, the English-speaking officer was

captured.

The 2d Bn - its objective the NOMENY-RAUCOURT road - had also moved through knee-deep mud and flood-waters to enter assault boats and to cross the river at 0637. Crossing was completed under moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire by 0650. Co E (CO: ^{in name of Rouves,} Capt Chmar) moved N to seize ROUVES. Early in the attack Capt Chmar was severely wounded but continued to lead the attack. On entering the outskirts of ROUVES the enemy opened fire with machine-guns to halt the company's advance.

50 Sgt Fitzgerald (Co E) ordered his men to locate the enemy machine gun while he ran back and forth across the street drawing the enemy fire. On the 3d trip across he was hit but continued to direct his squad to the enemy gun which was subsequently destroyed. [As Co E and ~~2d Co Capt Jackson~~ cleared and secured ROUVES, Cos F and G bypassed the town to the E and successfully seized the road junction near HILL 211 on the RAUCOURT-NOMENY highway (Rt 413). The junction was secured by 0830.

[At this time the enemy launched a counter-attack from RAUCOURT ~~XXXXXX~~ toward ROUVES. Co E withdrew from ROUVES and moved in behind Cos F and G. The enemy thrust consisted of about 100 infantry supported by heavy machine gun and tank fire. Excellent fields of fire quickly disorganized the enemy attack. Co F (CO: Capt Cook), Co G and the antitank company opened fire with automatic weapons, mortars and 57mm AT guns.

[Capt Cook (Co F) remained in an open field completely devoid of cover and directed our weapons on the advancing enemy who lost a number of men plus two 75mm guns, one AT gun as well as automatic weapons. The enemy positions in MAILLY SUR SEILLE opened artillery fire on ROUVES but a few high explosive rounds from our artillery effectively stopped the action. While Co F and G secure the NOMENY-RAUCOURT road, Co E re-entered ROUVES to finish mopping up the town. Positions were maintained by the battalion in and around ROUVES for the night.

The 3d Bn remained in reserve positions until 0830 when it moved across the SEILLE RIVER ~~xxxx~~, completing the crossing by 0930. Co I (CO:

) was sent from the landing area to seize the high ground NW of NOMENY and thence to strike the town from the rear. Because the 1st Bn had secured the high ground N of the town on HILL 217 - thus cutting NOMENY off from the N - little resistance was expected. [As Co I approached the outskirts of the town, enemy infantry opened up on the advancing Co I from the high ground immediately to the N (HILL 211) adjacent to the NOMENY-RAUCOURT highway. Pinned down by the heavy fire, 1st Sgt ^(C.I.) Dooley dashed across 200 yards of fire swept ground to direct the mortar section fire on enemy targets. Under Dooley's guidance the mortar unit knocked out four enemy machine guns and killed 20 Germans. PFC's Young and Dentinger (Co I) volunteered time and again to move over exposed ground to bring ammunition and supplies to the line of defense. [Later, a platoon of tanks of Co B, 702d Tank Bn arrived and the subsequent action drove the enemy off the high ground into NOMENY. Co I then assaulted the town and captured over 200 prisoners despite having sustained over 75 casualties during the attack. [Throughout the day over 300 of the enemy were captured including 3 officers. CT 318 spent the evening and night securing its positions which extended from ROUVES on the NE to NOMENY on the SE. [Credit for ~~assistance in~~ the successful assault by CT 318 ~~must~~ - in part - be given to the accuracy of artillery fire laid down by the 314th F.A. Bn. Lt Hall (314th FA Bn), as artillery liaison officer, and one man moved across exposed ground and under heavy enemy fire to establish an observation post. While under fire their radio was knocked out. Lt Hall remained in position observing the enemy while Sgt Whiteside (314th FA Bn) dashed back under fire to obtain another radio. As a result of the continuous enemy fire, this radio was also knocked out and Whiteside went to get another, retracing his steps

Pg 353 Line 14
 8138 Wm to make a HB on Naur
 9/10/18 to the 11/10/18
 11/10/18 to 11/10/18

Pg 353 Line 14
 8138 Wm to make a HB on Naur
 9/10/18 to the 11/10/18
 11/10/18 to 11/10/18

Pg 353 Line 14
 8138 Wm to make a HB on Page
 9 of the book a Page from HB
 8138 to Pg 354.

The 2d Bn, moving N along the left ~~(E)~~ flank of the 1st Bn, advanced from the vicinity of ROUVES NE between RAUCOURT on the N and MAILLY SUR SEILLE on the S. By 0922, Cos E (CO: Capt Chmar), F (CO: Capt Cook) and G (CO: ~~Capt Cook~~) had entered BOIS DE SEIGNEUR (1500 yards N of MAILLY SUR SEILLE). The assault companies encountered strong enemy opposition in the vicinity and a pitched battle for possession of the woods ensued. In the battle Capt Chmar (Co E) and Capt Cook (Co F) were wounded. Sgt Crowe (Co G) - his company pinned down by the intense enemy fire - rushed across the fire-swept open ground to wipe out an enemy machine-gun halting the advance of his company. By 1330 the 2d Bn had cleared the woods and had taken 75 prisoners. The assault companies then turned due E to enter the adjacent woods BOIS DE PHLIN 1000 yards N of PHLIN), securing the latter by 1515 where the troops halted the advance for the day. Co H (CO: Capt Jackson) closed in the vicinity of ROUVES.

The 3d Bn, ^{supported by cos 702 TK BN} encountering occasional harrassing fire, cleared the remaining enemy from the vicinity of NOMENY by 1120. Leaving Co I (CO:) to hold NOMENY, the remaining elements of the battalion moved NE to closed in MAILLY SUR SEILLE by 1726. The Regimental CP and Co B 305 Med Bn ^{under command of Lt} entered NOMENY late in the evening. As of 1900 over 1,000 enemy troops in the sector of CT 318 were making a general withdrawal to the E and NE.

The weather of 10 Nov 44 turned colder and the skies cloudy with the threat of more rain. In the late morning hours a heavy downpour began which soon turned to sleet as CT 318 prepared for the assault E. The objective assigned the Regiment was DELME RIDGE. The ridge lay 1 mi E of FOVILLE (2 mi E of PHLIN) and ran in a NW to SE direction across the Regimental front. Over 400 feet in height and 3000 yards long, the

*Delme Ridge towards E
48th Inf Div. Pg 3.4*

ridge overlooked LIOCOURT at its W base, FLOCOURT to the W beyond LIOCOURT, and was a formidable natural barrier to the advance E. Beyond the ridge, in a northeasterly direction, lay the towns of JUVILLE, MONCHEUX, THIMONVILLE, MORVILLE SUR NIED and BAUDRECOURT, the latter ~~town being~~ on the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER. The territory NE of the town of FOVILLE ^{including Delme Ridge,} was in the possession of the German 48th Division which had recently received additional troops of the SS as support.

At 0900 the 1st Bn moved E 2 miles toward ~~FOVILLE~~ ^{FOVILLE} encountering no resistance. By 1000 Cos A (CO:) and ~~C~~ (CO:) had entered FLOCOURT with elements of the 702d Tank Bn in support. Scattered resistance was encountered within the town but by 1010 the town was taken. During the advance increasing enemy sniper fire was received from the NW end of DELME RIDGE. Moving NE from FOVILLE, Cos A and C - with Co B (CO: Lt McIlmail) in reserve - reached a point 500 yards SW of JUVILLE (2 mi NE of FOVILLE) by 1130. Enroute between FOVILLE and JUVILLE, elements of the ~~battalion~~ ^{48th} cleared the extreme NW slopes of DELME RIDGE. The greater portion of the ridge was seized in courageous frontal assault by elements of CT 319. The assault troops advanced through heavy enemy fire, booby traps and mine fields backed up by three enemy anti-tank guns, to secure the ridge. As the enemy retreated before the CT 319, they became victims of their own mine fields in their haste to withdraw.

c. etc d. Delme

*CT 319 was made to take c. 1000 men
supplied by road etc.
Pg 3.4 also Pg 91
for Delme Ridge*

By 1300 elements of Co A and C had entered JUVILLE. A portion of the tank support had lost contact with the assault companies and had entered the wrong town (MONCHEUX?). Co B was brought up in support as the lead companies encountered stiff enemy resistance. Sgt Hagens (Co B), although severely wounded by a shell fragment, continued into

the town of JUVILLE along side a tank whose fire he was directing on enemy positions. An enemy bazooka team opened fire on Hagen and the tank missing both. Hagen returned the fire killing the enemy and continued on his mission until his wound became too painful and he had to be evacuated. By 1330 the town was in the hands of the 1st Bn. Cos A and B went into defense positions on the high ground of HILL 264 NE of the town. Co C, in reserve positions was joined by Co D (CO: Capt Barry) in the evening and the battalion closed in the vicinity for the night.

The 2d Bn at 0900 moved E through BOIS DE PILIN and then attacked NE toward its objectives of SAILLY, ACHATTEL and MONCHEUX. By 0945, SAILLY to the N was secured. The assault companies then moved 500 yards N to take ACHATTEL. From this position the battalion then pushed 2 mi E to seize MONCHEUX. Co G (CO:) had moved 1 mi E from BOIS DE PILIN to capture VULMONT. The assault companies consolidated their advance and, late in the night, began to concentrate in the vicinity of MONCHEUX.

The 3d Bn, in Regimental reserve, moved E from MAILLY SUR SEILLE. Co I (CO:) closed in MONCHEUX; Cos K (CO:), L (CO:) and M (CO:) relieved Co G in VULMONT and remained in the town for the night as security for the 3d Bn CP. Cannon Co closed in PILIN at 1215 where it was soon joined by Co B 305 Med Bn.

On 11 Nov 44, at CT 318 pushed E, the weather turned very cold. During the night the enemy had withdrawn its main forces NE in an attempt to establish a defense line from TRAGNY on the W through THILMONVILLE and SE to MORVILLE SUR NIED. Between this line and the forward elements of CT 318 lay the brushwoods of BOIS DE JUVILLE.

At 0800 CT 318 jumped off with the 1st Bn on the Regimental right and

the 2d Bn on the left. The 3d Bn, in reserve, followed behind the assault battalions. The 1st Bn struck NE from its positions around JUVILLE. Co A and B moved off HILL 264 and, passing through the 2d Bn positions in MONCHEUX attacked toward the high ground N of MORVILLE SUR NIED in the vicinity of BOIS DES HAIES (S of THIMONVILLE). By 1015 the woods had been cleared and the companies joined in ~~an~~ the attack on MORVILLE SUR NIED. Co G moved NE through BOIS DE JUVILLE against token resistance and secured the area by 1130. As the 1st Bn approached the town it encountered heavy enemy fire from enemy automatic weapons and direct fire from 75mm anti-tank guns. Lt McIlmail (Co B) was wounded as his company swept forward into the town. Despite the determined resistance the town was wrested from the enemy by nightfall and 20 prisoners were captured. The 1st Bn occupied the town and positions E across LE DIDELBAU RIVER to the W bank of the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER for the night.

The 2d Bn, on the Regimental left flank, advanced at 0600 NE 2 mi from the vicinity of MONCHEUX to assault TRAGNY. Co E (CO: Capt Kirkman) waded across the RAU DIT LIEE STREAM and had just entered the outskirts of the town when heavy small arms fire was received. Close fighting ensued as the enemy fell back building by building, street by street. At times our own armor support fired blindly into possible targets within the town endangering the assault companies. Sgts DiMartino and Heath (Co F) observed a large group of the enemy hastily entering a cellar of a nearby house. The two men advanced through the intensive fire to hurl grenades into the cellar. When the smoke cleared over fifty of the enemy plus four officers stumbled out to surrender. By 1000 TRAGNY was seized and the battalion turned E toward THIMONVILLE. By this time the 2d Bn had been seriously depleted by mounting casualties and its troops had been whittled down to 150 men. All the battalion rifle platoons were massed together into a single company supported by the fire power of the four

weapons platoons and a weapons company. Moving behind the tanks of the 702d Tank Bn, the remnants of the battalion entered THIMONVILLE which had been secured earlier. On reaching the town the 2d Bn entered Regimental reserve.

The 3d Bn in WILMONT had moved E behind the attacking 2d Bn and had entered MONCHEUX. Passing N through elements of the 2d Bn still in TRAGNY, Cos I (CO:), L (CO:) and M (CO:

) moved NE to seize ST EPVRE (1.5 mi E of FROCOURT) without encountering enemy defenses by 1800. The battalion then turned E meeting little resistance in its march to the W bank of the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER. A double tracked railroad bridge was found intact in the vicinity of ST EPVRE. Although the bridge ~~spanned~~ the river to the SE the battalion made no move to cross. Co K (CO:) remained in TRAGNY as support for the battalion CP. Positions were consolidated for the night in a NE to SW line from TRAGNY NE to ST EPVRE. Cannon Co moved from PHLIN via FOVILLE to close in MONCHEUX by 1245. Co B 305 Med Bn entered MONCHEUX later this day.

During the period 10-11 Nov 44 the enemy had withdrawn its main forces NE of the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER line. The weather continued increasingly colder as CT 318 cleared the zone SW of the river. Over 300 enemy prisoners had been taken, including five officers and 53 NCOs, during the last 48 hours.

On 12 Nov 44, as the weather turned bitterly cold, the US 6th Armored Division constructed a bridge over the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER at BAUDRECOURT (1 mi NE of MORVILLE SUR NIED). At 1335 the 1st Bn - supported by Co B 702d Tank Bn - moved across the river behind the armor. As the 6th Armored Division turned N toward HERNY and MANY, the 1st Bn swung

S along the E bank of the river towards LUCY (1.5 mi S of the crossing site). Enroute a light snow fell but quickly ceased. LUCY was assaulted by Co B (CO:) and C (CO:), followed by supporting Co D (CO:) and Co A (CO:) in reserve. In the effort to capture LUCY, Co B sustained 33 casualties when it encountered increasing enemy fire from mortars, machine-guns and small arms as it approached the town. Sgt Clark (CO B), when his company was pinned down by the intense fire, move to the front ~~under heavy~~ to rally the forward elements and lead them on to destroy the enemy enplacements. By 1800 the town was captured. ^{7:00 PM} The battalion then cleared and outposted the high ground to the E and the woods BOIS DE LUCY to the SE in the territory of CT 319. At 2000 the 1st Bn was relieved of its positions by elements of CT 319 which had crossed the river to the S at FREMERY. The 1st Bn remained in LUCY until the following day.

During the day the battered remanants of the 2d Bn moved from MONCHEUX and TRAGNY NE to FLOCOURT as Regimental reserve behind the 3d Bn.

The 3d Bn, massed in the vicinity of ST EPVRE, crossed the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER at 1105 over the ^{INTACT} railroad bridge and, supported by elements of the 6th Armored Division, swung N 1 mi to attack VATIMONT. Heavy enemy mortar fire slowed the advance. Counter mortar fire effectively silenced the enemy positions and the battalion captured the town by 1800. Positions were taken in the town and on the high ground NE in the vicinity of the LE VATIMONT plantation for the night. The Regimental CP and Co B 305 Med Bn moved to ST EPVRE and Cannon Co closed in FLOCOURT.

On 13 Nov 44 snow again fell on the Regimental positions during the bitterly cold early morning hours. By noon the snows had melted to turn the trails and roads to mud, but the weather remained cold, wet, and generally disagreeable. The 1st Bn moved NE from LUCY at 0910 to take

8 Co B 1627 hrs 64

CHENOIS (1 mi NE of LUCY) against light and scattered resistance. Continuing the attack NE the battalion cleared LESSE (2 mi NE of BAUDRECOURT) by 1115. Moving N across the rail-road tracks, the assault companies pushed 1,000 yards to seize HOLOCOURT. While Co A outposted the VATIMONT-ARRAINCOURT highway to the W of HOLOCOURT, Co C established defenses astride the highway to the E. Co B and D closed in HOLOCOURT as security for the battalion CP.

The 2d Bn, in reserve, moved from HOLOCOURT E to ST EPREVRE behind the 3d Bn. The 3d Bn, now on the Regimental left flank, remained in the vicinity of VATIMONT ^{BAUDRECOURT} clearing out the last vestiges of enemy resistance. S of the VATIMONT-ARRAINCOURT highway contact was established with the left flank of the 1st Bn. Cannon Co moved into VATIMONT ~~and~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

The 80th Infantry Division on 14 Nov 44 was in position on the left (N) flank of the US XII Corps. The skies were overcast and the weather became increasingly colder as CT 318, on the Divisional left flank, consolidated its positions S of the VATIMONT-ARRAINCOURT highway.

The 1st Bn , in a tactical march, moved E 1.5 mi, passing ARRAINCOURT on the S, to occupy BRULANGE. Co A outposted the high ground N of the town along the BRULANGE-THONVILLE highway. Co C went into position in the vicinity of HILL 281 some 500 yards E of THONVILLE. Co B and B remained with the CP in BRULANGE.

The 2d Bn, in reserve, moved from ST EPREVRE via BAUDRECOURT to HOLOCOURT to close in the latter town by 1915 as support for the Regimental CP. Co F (CO: Capt McDonald) moved 1 mi E to take up defensive positions around ARRAINCOURT.

The 3d Bn after clearing the vicinity of VATIMONT moved NE to occupy the high ground NW of THONVILLE (1 mi NE of BRULANGE). Co I outposted the high ground E of VATIMONT. Co L moved to secure THICOURT (500 yds NW of THONVILLE) by 1800.

By the close of the period the 80th Division, with three regiments abreast, had turned the point of its advance from E and NE to due N after reaching HOLOCOURT. The front of CT 318 extended from VATIMONT on the W through THICOURT to THONVILLE on the E. At the close of the period Co B 305 Med Bn moved via VATIMONT to ARRAIN COURT.

Snow again fell during the morning of 15 Nov 44 but, as before, melted by noon. Little change occurred in the Regimental positions throughout the day. The 1st Bn continued to outpost BRULANGE NE to THONVILLE with the support of two platoons of Co B, 308th Tank Destroyer Bn. The 2d Bn, in Regimental reserve in HOLOCOURT vicinity, reverted to Divisional Reserve later in the day. The 3d Bn CP remained in THONVILLE with Co K (CO: Capt Eyerly) while the remainder of the battalion fanned out to occupy the high ground to the NW, N and NE in the vicinity of HILL 312.

The cloudy skies and cold weather persisted through 16 Nov 44. A coordinated attempt by CT 319 - plus elements of the 6th Armored Division - pushed N to secure the LLR from CHELNEY (2 mi NE of THONVILLE) W to the high ground N of THICOURT in the vicinity of BOIS DES TAILLES (HILLS 252 and 243).

At 1400 the 1st Bn moved from its positions and, under light enemy artillery fire, occupied the left half of the Regimental sector. Enemy resistance continued light as the battalion forward elements moved NW to the vicinity of BOIS DES TAILLES. Co B (CO:) moved 500 yards N of THONVILLE to set up defenses on HILL 312 as Regimental

reserve (W of Elncheville)

The 2d Bn remained in Division reserve in HOLOCOURT throughout the day. At 0900 the 3d Bn moved slowly N under heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire. Co I (CO: Capt Eyerly), with Co K (CO:) on the left, moved to enter BOIS DE THONVILLE at 0940 against moderate enemy automatic fire and heavy mortar and artillery concentrations. Pushing their way through the woods past the cross-roads below CLEMERY, the assault companies entered the town. The enemy continued to throw artillery into CLEMERY during the night. During one particularly heavy concentration Capt Eyerly (Co I) was wounded when shells hit a building he was near. By nightfall CLEMERY and HILL 325 were secured.

Late in the evening the enemy launched an attack from the woods BOIS DE NEULAENDER and BRUNBERG (500 yds N of CLEMERY). Quickly repulsed, the enemy withdrew N toward FAULQUEMONT leaving only a small force between CT 318 and the MACINOT LINE. The principal enemy units encountered in the days action were elements of the German 36th Grenadier Division - the 118th and 165th Grenadier Regiments and the 268th Artillery Regiment. Interrogation of prisoners taken during the day indicated that the enemy had been instructed to hold the area at all costs and those withdrawing without orders were to be shot. As the period closed CT 318 developed its defenses from CLEMERY W to BOIS DES TAILLES.

The cloudy skies and cold weather persisted as CT 318 improved positions during 17 Nov 44. The lines of the Regiment now extended from the high ground NW of BOIS DES TAILLES E to CLEMERY. The 1st Bn held the high ground NW (HILL 252) and N (BOIS DES TAILLES) in the THICOURT-THONVILLE vicinity. The battalion CP was in THICOURT with Co A and D, Co B was on HILL 312; Co C moved to occupy HILL 252 later in the day. The 2d Bn re-

Co I Attk Elncheville 1741
Eyerly with
Co K Elncheville 1741

By nightfall
I in CLEMERY
K in Bois de Thonville
L in Bois des Tailles

remained in Division reserve in the vicinity of HOLOCOURT. The 2d Bn CP with Co E (CO: Capt Kirkman), G (CO: Capt Stallings) and H (CO:) was in the town. Co F (CO:) moved E across the highway to occupy ARRAINCOURT. The 3d Bn and Cos I, L and M occupied CLEMERY on the Regimental right flank. Co K outposted the town to the N.

From 17-20 Nov 44 CT 318 consolidated its positions, strengthened its defenses and maintained contact with the withdrawing enemy through vigorous patrolling by the Regimental forward elements. The weather remained clear and - in general - was cool to fair. To the Division front were elements of the German 36th Volks Grenadier Division which had been desperately attempting to halt the advance of the 80th Inf Division since 14 Nov 44 without success. The enemy 36th Division had recently arrived from the BAUMHOLDER TRAINING AREA (N of Strasbourg) where it had been reformed after its destruction in RUSSIA in 1943. Its purpose had been to develop a defense line between METZ on the W and FAULQUEMONT on the E. However, the attack of the 80th Infantry Division on 16 Nov 44 over-ran the enemy lines. The enemy then unsuccessfully tried to plug the break in its defenses with elements of the battered German 559th and 48th Infantry Divisions. The successful assault of CT 318 NE from BAUDRECOURT to CLEMERY with the support of the 6th Armored Division materially brought about the enemy withdrawal N beyond the NIED ALLEMANDE RIVER.

Along the E flank of CT 318 the highway D20 ran from EINCHEVILLE (1.5 mi S of CLEMERY) N 5 mi past CLEMERY to FAULQUEMONT which was situated on the NIED ALLEMAND RIVER. To the S of FAULQUEMONT, and flanking the highway (D20) were the woods LE KRITZBESCH and HERRENWALD, W and E of the road, respectively. S of LE KRITZBESCH lay BOIS DE NEULAENDER and below that, CLEMERY.

Northward across the NIED FRANCAISE RIVER and N of FAULQUEMONT, the enemy forces developed their defenses in the vicinities of TRITTELING, LAUDREFANG N to BAMBIDERSTROFF and E to ST AVOLD.

Hampered slightly by the sudden cold rains of 20 Nov 44, CT 318 made preparations to continue the attack N. The 1st Bn moved from its positions in the vicinity of THONVILLE and THICOURT to positions ^{*}behind the 3d Bn. ^{10th Meuse Dr} ^{Le Kr. 72 Besch} The 2d Bn remained in HOLOCOURT as Divisional reserve.

The 3d Bn, at 1200, attacked N along D20 and cleared the woods BOIS DE NEULAENDER, LE KRITZBESCH and HERRENWALD. Continuing N in the heavy rain with Co L leading, the battalion reached the outskirts of FAULQUEMONT, ^{and seized the town} ¹⁶⁴⁷ against little opposition by 1700. Co I remained in CHEMERY. ^{Co K was at left & Co L was at right in town by dawn}

The 1st Bn followed the 3d Bn and took up positions for the remainder of the day in LE KRITZBESCH. Co A moved into position to the S in BOIS DE NEULAENDER and HILL 270 just E of the highway D-20. Co B outposted ADELANGE (1 mi SE of LE KRITZBESCH) parallel to the highway. Co C went into positions along the NE edge of LE KRITZBESCH. The battalion CP was in CHEMERY. Cannon Co and Co B 305 Med Bn closed with the Regimental CP in THICOURT.

Early in the morning of 21 Nov 44 the 1st Bn moved from LE KRITZBESCH to FAULQUEMONT, ^{Key position} where it entered Regimental reserve. Co A established roadblocks and outposted the highway (Rt N110) running NE to TRITTELING (4 mi NE of FAULQUEMONT). ^{One of the best defense positions} Co B moved from FAULQUEMONT via GONNEHOLZ FARM and TRITTELING to enter LAUDREFANG (1 mi NE of TRITTELING) at 1945. At this time an enemy attack from the E in the vicinity of BRUNDSTUDENT FARM (between TRITTELING and LAUDREFANG) cut Co B off in the town. A patrol under Lt G. Williams (Co A) was sent to establish contact with

the encircled company. Enroute Lt Williams observed an enemy machine-gun emplacement covering the advance and he moved forward and pulled the gun from its concealment and killed the occupants of the machine gun nest. The action drew intense enemy fire and Williams made his way back to the patrol and lead them to safety. No contact was established with Co B during the night and the battalion made preparations for the relief of Co B with the support of a company of tanks.

Through the day the 2d Bn remained in Divisional reserve in and around HOLOCOURT SE of the 1st and 3d Bns. The 3d Bn moved NW from FAULQUEMONT to secure DORVILLER (3 mi) and then cleared BASSE-VIGNEULLES. Patrols of the battalion probing NE and E from this point found HAUTE-VIGNEULLES (1 mi) and BARBIDERSTROFF (6 mi N of FAULQUEMONT) unoccupied by the enemy. The 3d Bn sent Co I to outpost REILLACH (3 mi N of FAULQUEMONT) and the battalion lines, at the close of the period extended from BASSE-VIGNEULLES E to REILLACH. Later in the day the 2d Bn moved from HOLOCOURT into reserve positions behind the 3d Bn and set up defenses in DORVILLER and FAULQUEMONT. Cannon Co and Co B 305 Med Bn moved to FAULQUEMONT by 1400.

Having lost its defense line on the NEED ALLEMAIND RIVER, the enemy withdrew NE from FAULQUEMONT vicinity to ST AVOLD (8 mi E of BARBIDERSTROFF) in an attempt to utilize the high ground upon which the MACINOT LINE had been constructed. The old fortifications provided shelter for command posts and troops. Field fortifications were constructed about these points. Impressed civilian labor from the nearby towns were forced to dig an antitank ditch the length of the W slope.

By the close of the day CT 318 held a line E from HAUTE-VIGNEULLES to BARBIDERSTROFF and thence SE to WREITLING. To the N of the Regiment, and running E to W, was the ZELLING-ST AVOLD HIGHWAY (Rt Nr 3). N of

the highway moving W to E lay ZIMMER, BOIS DE KORENT, KLEINDAHL, LONGEVILLE LES ST AVOLD and ST AVOLD. N of LONGEVILLE, and extending 4 mi to ST AVOLD, were the massive woods FORET DE LONGEVILLE.

At 0730, in the cold rain of 22 Nov 44, the 1st Bn moved to relieve the besieged elements of Co B in LAUDREFANG. The battalion - reinforced by elements of Co B 702 Tank Bn - moved N along the PAULQUEMONT-TRITTELING HIGHWAY (N 410). By 0847, Cos A and C had reached the high ground W of LAUDREFANG (HILL 347) against stiffening resistance. Heavy mortar and artillery fire was encountered at this point. Lt Brown (Co D), leading a machine gun platoon in support of the assault companies, received a number of shrapnel wounds in the back, legs and arms. Disregarding his wounds he placed his men in positions under continuous shelling and effectively silenced the enemy emplacements. Sgt Stone (Co D), mortar section leader, was mortally wounded. Stone reorganized the mortar section and continued to place his men in position and directed their fire on enemy targets. Sgt Stone (Co D), mortar section leader, was acting as forward observer. As his company approached LAUDREFANG it was attacked on the flank by enemy infantry supported by machine-gun fire. Unable to contact the mortar section officer, Stone reorganized all available rifle men in the vicinity and, after breaking up the infantry attack, moved forward at the head of his men to lead an assault on the enemy machine-gun which was subsequently destroyed and its crew captured. Co B, as a result of the advance, was able to withdraw from LAUDREFANG under harrassing enemy mortar fire W to BRUNDSTUDENT FARM. Cos A and C then withdrew S to their former positions in PAULQUEMONT by 1019 where they were later joined by Co B.

Through the day the 2d Bn moved to concentrate its units in and around DORVILLER and outposted HILL 333 (N of DORVILLER). The 3d Bn (-Co I in

RELLACH) moved E to close in CITES DES CHARBONNAGES DE FAULQUEMONT. Co I moved N from RELLACH to occupy HILL 406 just E of the cross-roads at CHARBONNAGES DE FAULQUEMONT. Cannon Co moved from FAULQUEMONT to join the 3d Bn as Co B 305 Med remained in the town.

As CT 318 strengthened its positions in the vicinity for the night, strong patrols were sent N and NE to probe the enemy lines and to secure prisoners for interrogation. Through these efforts it was learned that a new enemy unit - the German 347th Grenadier Division - had recently relieved components of the enemy 36th Infantry Division in the latter's sector extending from BOIS DE MEDECHEN (1 mi N of ZIMMING) through ZIMMING to the vicinity N of BAMBIDERSTROFF. At this time elements of the 347th Grenadier Division also held LONGEVILLE LES ST AVOLD (2 mi NE of BAMBIDERSTROFF).

There was little combat activity throughout the Regimental sector 23 Nov 44. The weather continued cold and intermittent rain added to the discomfort. The 1st Bn, in Regimental Reserve, moved N by foot to close in CITES DES CHARBONNAGES DE FAULQUEMONT by 1500. The 2d Bn in DORVILLER continued to outpost Co F on HILL 383 NE of the town, in the area of the woods GEISSBUSCH on the NW tip of BOIS DIT STEINBUSH. A reinforced platoon was sent at 1730 to occupy HILL 310 W (1.5 mi) of the town. The 3d Bn occupied CITES DES CHARBONNAGES, with Co I perched in defensive positions on HILL 406. Co B 305 Med Bn closed in behind the 3d Bn by night. Co C, 610 (SP) Tank Destroyer Bn was attached late in the day. CT 318 established the Regimental CP in CHARBONNAGES.

Through 24 Nov 44 only minor changes took place in the Regimental zone. The weather was cold and wet. CT 318 was preparing for forward movement the next day. The 1st Bn remained in reserve positions of yesterday. The 2d Bn, ^{extending its left flank,} moved Co G 2 mi N of DORVILLER to set up defenses just beyond the

woods GEISSBUSCH in the town of HAUTE-VIGNEULLES (2 mi W of BAMBIDER-
Co F M 383 Co I 406 STROFF). The 3d Bn sent Co L E into REILLACH below HILL 406. Cannon Co
set up its CP in the vicinity of a coal mine on the outskirts of CHAR-
BONNAGES.

The rains ceased during the early morning hours 25 Nov 44 and, at 0800,
the 80th Infantry Division struck N against the fortifications of the
MAGINOT LINE.

3d Bn. on the Regimental right flank, pushed N to storm the fortifications of FT BAMBIDERSTROFF. By 0900 the high ground SE of BAMBIDERSTROFF was cleared. Moving slowly N and NE the advance was halted by a terrific volume of fire from enemy automatic weapons, mortars and artillery. From the FORTS BAMBIDERSTROFF, KERSTEN and BANNBUSCH poured a heavy volume of enemy 75mm fire. Co I (CO: Capt Doan) moved forward until halted before its objective by the hostile fire, a stream, and an anti-tank ditch. Capt Doan reorganized his company and continued the assault, seizing the objective. In consolidating the gained ground, Capt Doan was mortally wounded. Sgt Deters (Co I), his platoon halted by the machine-gun fire and an enemy bazooka team, borrowed a grenade launcher and rushed 60 yards to kill the bazooka crew with one shot. Lt Alston (Co L), a weapons platoon leader, exposed himself time and again to effectively place his weapon crews in support of the assault companies. Realizing that man-power was needed at the time, he voluntarily joined the assault. Alston charged forward firing and hurling grenades, encouraging his men to follow. It was at the climax of the attack that he was killed by enemy fire.

By 1100 the 3d Bn had taken two of the MAGINOT LINE forts and the advance moved on to seize HILLS 405 and 312 (N and S of Route NF 3, respectively), HILL 343 to the S of HILL 312, and HILL 367 along Route 74 just S of HILL 343. Thus, reducing all MAGINOT LINE forts in the zone of its advance, the 3d Bn closed in these positions for the night. *He was Longville Tex 57 Area.*

The 1st Bn, following in the wake of the 3d Bn, was not committed and moved cross-country to close for the night in the vicinity of BAMBIDERSTROFF where the battalion was joined by the Regimental CP and Cannon Co at 1700.

The MAGINOT LINE in the sector of CT 313 had been manned by newly

arrived German units. A German officer - the CO, 3d Bn, 361st Infantry Regiment, 347th Infantry Division - whose outfit was obliterated by the advance of CT 318, commented on the rapidity and aggressiveness of the well-coordinated infantry-tank attack. The captured officer stated the American assault to be "almost perfect" with respect to discipline, tactics coordination and camouflage. Within two hours the MAGINOT LINE had been breached at several point on the line extending from ZIMMING SE 6 miles to the N of LAUDREFANG. In the assault the Regiment had taken over 200 prisoners.

Through 26 Nov 44 the weather continued cloudy and cool. CT 318 continued to probe N and NE and to improve its positions in the vicinity of the MAGINOT LINE. The 1st Bn, still in Regimental reserve, moved from BAMBIDERSTROFF and crossed Route NP 3 to ST DOMINIQUE FARM. Co A was sent to fill the gap between the 2d and 3d Dns in BOIS DE KERENT and in the town of KLEINDAHL, respectively. The 2d Bn remained in the woods and also secured the high ground N in the vicinity of HILL 351, ^{not Bn's sector} The 3d Bn, at 0800, moved Cos I, K(CO: Capt Matlick) and L N to clear the vicinity of KLEINDAHL and to secure HILL 340 (N of LONGEVILLE) by 0845. In these positions, Co L on the N slope of HILL 340 received four enemy counter-attacks between 0845 and 1700. Having assumed command of his platoon when his platoon leader (Lt Kelly?) had been mortally wounded, Sgt Miles (Co L) led his men through the day and successfully thwarted the enemy attempts to take his sector. At 1700, another enemy counter-attack was forming but was broken up by a TOT concentration fired by all nine batteries of Corps artillery. The concentration landed squarely on the advancing enemy. No other movements were made by the Regiment which dug in for the night. Co B 305 Med Bn closed in BAMBIDERSTROFF later in the evening.

Good weather prevailed through 27 Nov 44 as the 1st Bn moved to secure the left flank of CT 319. Supported by elements of the 610th and 808th Tank Destroyer Bns and the 702d Tank Bn, the 1st Bn attacked N from ST DOMINICK FARM at 1000 to clear FORET DE LONGEVILLE from its W edge to the high ground on the E edge. Little enemy resistance was encountered and by 1400 Cos A and C had reach the high ground of HILL 189, the battalion objective. At 1715 the battalion closed into buildings on the N edge of ST AVOLD which had been cleared by CT 319 that morning. The 2d Bn remained in position on the high ground N of BOIS DE KERFENT until 1600 when it moved S into LONGEVILLE LES ST AVOLD. The 3d Bn continued to occupy the high ground N of LONGEVILLE to the W edge of FORET DE LONGEVILLE. By nightfall the Regimental CP, Cannon Co and Co B 305 Med Bn entered LONGEVILLE. CT 318 then entered Division reserve. At the close of 27 Nov 44 CT 318 held positions facing N and extending from the vicinity of LONGEVILLE-KLEINDAHL eastward above and below Route NF 3 to include ST AVOLD.

On 28 Nov 44, at 1100, the 1st Bn moved 4 mi E of ST AVOLD, passing along the route below FORET DE STEINBERG to enter GUENVILLER at 1445. Late that night the battalion moved 1 mi E along Route 80 to close for the night in SEINGBOUSE by 2230. Positions were staked out E of the town for the night. At 1100, the 2d and 3d Bns had entrucked at LONGEVILLE and moved E along Route 3 to ST AVOLD by 1300. While the 3d Bn remained to secure the vicinity of ST AVOLD, the 2d Bn closed in positions behind the 1st Bn. The positions of the Regiment afforded a defense in depth from SEINGBOUSE W should the enemy attack from the vicinity of FAREBERSVILLER (1 mi E of SEINGBOUSE) which was under attack by CT 317. The CP of CT 318 closed in ST AVOLD. Cannon Co moved via ST AVOLD SE 2.5 mi to MACHEREN (1 mi S of HUENVILLER) by 1500.

KT Nichols is: 8034

CT 318, on 29 Nov 44, moved into positions relieving CT 317. The weather remained unchanged as the 1st Bn ^{was} departed SEINGBOUSE at 1645 to close in positions 500 yards NW of FAREBERSVILLER by 1815 (Co A CO: ^{was} Capt Roy; Co B CO: ^{was} ; Co C CO: Lt Grady; Co D CO: ^{was}). In this position the battalion covered the movement of CT 317 to reserve positions and contact ^{through} was also established with CT 319 on the left flank. The 2d Bn ^{was} moved SE from ~~SEINGBOUSE~~ ^{GUENVILLER} to the vicinity of HENRIVILLE (3 mi SE of GUENVILLER) where it entered positions S of FAREBERSVILLER. Co E outposted the town to the E and Co H established defensive positions on the DIEBLING road at FARSCHVILLER (2 mi E of HENRIVILLE). The 3d Bn moved via MACHEREN to SEINGBOUSE by 1835. The Regimental CP was established in MACHEREN. Co B 305 moved to GUENVILLER by 1600.

Little change occurred in the weather or in the positions of CT 318 during the period 29-30 Nov 44. The 1st Bn strengthened its positions NW and W of FAREBERSVILLER, dominating the town with its fire. Co A was sent into defensive positions 1 mi W of FAREBERSVILLER. The 2d Bn occupied HENRIVILLE and the 3d Bn, in SEINGBOUSE, entered Division Reserve. As the month of November, 1944 drew to a close, CT 318 had sustained 980 casualties, of which 121 were killed, 774 wounded and 35 missing. The enemy losses resulted in a known total of 1585 men, including 120 killed.

⑧
⑤

30 Nov 44. Lt Willis (Co B) ^{to 4 men} & patrol left Seingbouse at 1130 & moved E to near mouth of stream in forest in the NW of FAREBERSVILLER. Patrol was fired on in S edge of town & Lt Willis KIA. Rest Ret'd. Stream was 6 inches deep & 15 ft wide; dead bottom.