HEADQUARTERS 317TH INFAHTRY APO # 80 U.S. Aroy

(5-1) / SEPTEMBER

20 Formber 1914

Subject: After Action Report, Personnel Administration, 1 Sep 44 to 30 Sep 44.

To : Adjutant General, Mashington, D.C., through Commanding General, Soth

- 1. The first few days of the extremely difficult and severe fighting up to and including the first attempt at crossing the Nes elle River developed a sudden, extremely heavy number of casualties. As the fighting in this motor continued to be severe for many days, the number of casualties to be accounted for created a problem in proper reporting, maintaining the desired degree of accuracy and at the same time, submitting all reports as rapidly as possible. The company clerks who had been designated to prepare the casualty report and maintain the casualty accounting were faced with the problem of keeping up with the development of a great ddal of work in the reporting and preparation of record or their own companies. The personnel Sergeant Wajor had great difficulty in mintaining immediate supervision of Casualty Reporting and keeping current with the rapidly increasing volume of work required of him. A former clerk in the personnal section, who had been serving in tattle as an aid man with a rifle company, was secured from the Division Convelescent Station, where he had been sent to recom-erate from a serious case of Fattle Pattigue. This elect sould se longer be able to perform the duties of aid man with the flighting troops and therefore, was assigned the duty to control the accounting for casualties, including the proparation of casualty reports, as a sole duty. This clerk at the present time maintains all records, prepares all reports and accounts for all caralties of this regiment. At times when casualties are becar, he is assisted in Compe aration of reports by the clerk of that company with is enjoying the least volume of work. This method has established a definite duty for no man and prowided a reliable method for controlling the reporting and accountles for all casualties. The results to date have been more than atisfactory.
- A continuous policy of indoctrination and education of first surpoints in the importance of proper, accurate casualty reporting must be conducted at every opportunity. Strong exphasis must also be placed on speed in conjunction with accuracy.

PLANE J. NATSON

Captain, 31%th Infantry Regimental Ristorian

HEADQUARTERS 317TH INFANTRY APO #80, U. S. AMEY

26 October 1944

Subject: After Action Report (S-2) /5 12 PTEMBER

Commanding Conseal, 90th Infantry Division, APO #00, U. S. Army

The following report (After Action) from S-2, 317th Infantry Regiment, is submitted in compliance with Section III, 2a Hamo #64, Headquarters 80th Infantry Division, dated 24 August 1944.

1 September 1944:

1) Enemy. There was no enemy contacted other than small delaying forces, and their attempts at delay were ineffective. Bridges were blown at MADERLY. LAMEYCOURT and EAR LE DUC, and the roads into NEVICHY were mined. There was no enemy front line, and no air, artillery or armor reported.

2) Elements effecting action. There was no recommensance by the ensuy, and the civilians seemed to be quite friendly. The terrain was hilly, with rivers running at right angles to the movement of the CT.

2 September 1944:

An enemy force estimated at 100 con(SS) CLASSIFICATION F BOUGHWILLS and 100 men in the vicinity of MONTSEC fought dela morters, but no artillery or other special rechol AVALUATE ADJUTANT GENERAL unsuccessful, and the energy withdraw to the

3 September-7 September 1944:

The enemy withdrew in the Resound RADING the Kest bank of the MOSELLE River, and organised there from PACMY to DIEULEUARD with an estimated Division. They were well supplied with artillery of all calibres, with / mortars, and with heavy and light machine guns. All bridges over the MOSELLE in the Regimental Zone of Action had been blown. The civilians were not as reliable as they has been previously, and very few of them who had recently been on the East bank of the MOSELL E were to be found, MOUSSON and XON hills on the East Bank of the MOSELLE, and the high ground to the North and South occupied by the Gersans afforded them excellent CP's and masks, behind thich it was possible to supply and shift troops, and locate Artillery without coming under our observation. In the river valley itself, the ground formed a flat, flood plain over a thousand yards wide, without cover or concaclment, / giving the Germans excellent fields of fire for their automatic wespons. The river and manal formed a double obstacle to our troops,

8 September-12 September 1944:

The Third Panser Grenadisr Division continued to organize on the East bank of the MCSELLE, and German artillery and morters were active, There were no other changes in the enemy situation during this period.

12 September 1944:

German forces from the 29th Regiment, 3d Motorised Division, and the 1121st Regiment of the 553d Division, were captured, and the boundary between these two divisions had passed through the bridge at SCAPORS. The light Regiment had six 81mm morters, four 120mm morters, and a number of light and heavy moshine guns in each battalion. The 29th Regiment had a similiar expendention. The 1121st had 16 bazookss (German) per bettalion. The attack of the CT317th on the norming of the 12th September took the defending Germans by surprise, and we had coptured our objectives before the Germans were able to take effective counter measures. The enemy has placed anti-personnel mines in the canal bank in the vicinity of our crossing points, but these were ineffective. German forces withdrew to a line from ATTON to the Road Junction at (US28321); to MILLERY to the MOSELLE River at (U765180), During the day, German 88 direct fire from MCUSSCH and 150m fire from positions further Northeast harrassed troops and morements in the visinity of the buildess built by the Engineers, and they attempted unsuccessfully to destroy those bridges. There were very few civilians in the bridgehead. Our forces had excellent observation of the ground to the East from the ST GENEVIEVE-BEZAUMONT ridge, and LA FALAIS bill. Enemy occupation of MCUSSCH gave them direct observation of the corssing sites, but the crossing at DEMULCERD was somethat screened from enemy observation by trees. We captured 16 PWs.

13 September 1944:

The Germans attacked early on the 13th September with 2 Battaliens of the 29th Pansor Grenadier Regiment, from FORST DE PACE, through ST GARNING and BEZAUMONT, then moved East toward VILLE AU VAL. The attack was supported by artillery and morter fire, and the Germans also had half-tracks, self-propelled guns and tanks. The Regiment destroyed eight German tanks during the counterattack, which was entirely repulsed by 1400 on the 13th September.

14 September 1944s

Early in the morning an enemy AGF unit, consisting of from 400 to 600 men attacked and seized LA FALAIS ridge. By 1700, our counterattack had retaken LA FALAIS, and time fire decimated the enemy AGF unit withdrawing.

15 September 1944

The Enemy, with an estimated force of 1 Battalion, counterattacked in the early morning, and ceptured ATTOW and ST GENEVIEVE. The attack was supported with tanks, self-propelled guns, estillery and morter fire. At 1630, an enemy force estimated at 1 Battalion and 33 tanks attacked the ST GENEVIEVE-BEZAUMO NT ridge, and were repulsed with the loss of an unieterained masher of tanks.

16 September 1944:

The enemy occupied the line LANDREMONT-Mill 301-MILLERY with about 2 battalions. They defended successfully at MILLERY and LANDREMONT, supported

by artillery and morters. At about 1700, remnants of the AGF unit which attacked the 3d Battalion on the 14th September, attacked again, but were driven off as darkness fell.

17 September 1944:

German forces occupied LANDREMONT-Hill 351-MILLERY. The force on Hill 351 consisted of an outpost and artillery OP, from which effective artillery and mortar fire could be directed on the advance of the 2d Battalien. In MILLERY, a small enemy force occupied the town and directed MG and mortar fire on K Company. There was a small delaying force in LANDREMONT which was strong in automatic weepons. All German forces were forced to withdraw.

18 September 1944:

The 3d Battalion met small enemy delaying forces in the Southwest sector on the BOIS DE CHAPITRE. These enemy forces tried to delay 3d Battalion in woods fighting, but were forced to withdraw.

19 September 1944:

Small enemy delaying forces operated ineffectively in the BOIS DE CAUPITRE.

20 September 1944:

An enemy force of about 100 men, with two 75mm AT guns and 5 HEG's held Hill 299 South of MILLEM. B Company's attack with tanks at 1700 captured forty-six PN's, and the remainder either scattered or were killed. The remnants of the enemy delaying detechments, estimated as 120 men, established a road thous at 62322499, interfering with the flow of sopplies to our at and 3d Battalions. This force had the support of 150mm guns and 120mm morters, with a radio for fire directions.

21 September-22 September 1944:

The enemy line to our front extended from hill 401 through ERATTE, The German road block at 85352499 continued to harass our supply, and resisted the attempts of the 1st Battalion to dislodge them.

23 September-25 September 1944:

The Germans at the road block at 85352499 were either killed, captured or withdrew during the might of the 23d September. Our 2d and 3d Battalious, attacking at 1630, were held up by enemy delaying forces, leavily armed with LMG's, on Hill 401. The delaying forces were either killed or captured, or withdrew to positions on MT ST JEAN-HOTVROWS, early on the 24th September.

26 September 1944:

An enemy force estimated at 1 battalion defended the Northwest part of MT ST JEAN, with the support of 120mm and 80mm mortars, 150mm gum, and direct fire artillery from JEANDELINGOURT, MOTVRONS and MT ST JEAN, and were able to maintain their positions. The 1st Eattalion of the 3d Paratroop Training Regiment, from well organised positions around MOTVRONS, supported by medium and light artillery and mortars, successfully defended against our attack, An enemy force estimated at 1 company were forced to withdraw from HILL 340 by the 1st Battalion, and occupied SERRIERS, SIVEY, MT ST JEAN (NS) and MOTVRONS.

27 September 1944:

The Germans, preceded by heavy artillery and morter fire, attacked Hill 340 with CT 13 (XII) and CT Hildebrand, a total strength of 200-250 men. The German attacking ferce come from SIVEX and SERRIERES, moved around the base of Hill 340, and attacked from the North and Southwest. These German forces suffered extremely heavy casualties, and the romannts were forced to withdraw. This force penetrated some of our forward positions and approached the C Company CP to within 15 feet, where they were killed or wounded by point blank pistol, machine-gun and rifle fire, as well as greenedes.

28 September 1944:

In the morning at about 0630 German remnents of about 120 men again attacked Hill 340, using tactics similiar to those used on the attack the night of the 26th-27th September. In a pite of a strong artillary concentration fired to precede the attack, the Germans were unable to get close enough to our Infantry to be effective. They again suffered heavy casualties, and were demoralized by artillary concentrations fired by our Cannon Company.

29 September-30 September 19441

The enemy compled MT ST JEAN, SIVEY, SERRIERES and MOIVAGES, and were active with 120mm and 80mm morters and light artillary fire.

Coptain, Infants Regimental S=2