

NVI  
Authority 7 35017  
By CO NARA Date 6-14-04

HEADQUARTERS 313TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
APO #80, U. S. Army

5 December 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report for period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive. (Section I - Summary of daily operations and action).

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

1. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS:

a. At opening of period of this report, battalion was occupying defensive positions in the FORET DE FACQ, west of FORT SUR SEILLE, in direct support of the 317th Inf who were in defensive positions west of SEILLE RIVER. Remained in this position until 9 November 1944. There was very little enemy activity during this period. Liaison officers and Forward Observers remained with the infantry. Complete plans for defensive fires were prepared and maintained. Firing was restricted to necessary registration and return of enemy fire. Harrassing and interdiction fires were delivered by supporting Tank and Tank Destroyer Units. Training of personnel, especially in conduct of fire and maintenance of equipment and materiel was stressed.

b. On 8 November 1944, direct support 317th Inf attacking to East to establish bridgehead on the SEILLE RIVER. Reinforcing Artillery for this attack consisted of 6th Armored Division Artillery (128 FA, 231 FA, 212 FA), the 183 GP (276 FA, 696 FA, 752 FA) the 512 FA and 974 FA; in addition to this, one platoon 808th TD Bn, one platoon 633d AA Bn, and Cn Co, 317th Inf. An extensive preparation was fired and the crossing was successful. Displaced to vicinity of EPLY at 0300 hours, 9 November 1944. Ground very soft and muddy due to continuing rain and bad weather. Seven prisoners taken in vicinity of CP. Displaced to vicinity of RESSINCOURT, direct support 317th Inf, 1530 hours, 10 November 1944. Reinforcing Artillery consisted of 974th FA and 512th FA. Displaced to vicinity of SECOURT at 0800 hours, 11 November 1944, and to LOUPY 1630 hours, same date. No change in mission. At 0900 hours, 13 November 1944, displaced to vicinity of HAN-SUR-NIED continuing direct support 317th Inf in pursuit of enemy. At 0900 hours, 15 November 1944, displaced to vicinity of HERNY. 0700, 16 November 1944, displaced to defensive positions north of HOLACOURT, direct support 317th Inf. Mission of Division to protect Corps left flank. Stress placed on rehabilitation of personnel and equipment. Weather still bad, ground soft and muddy.

c. Division attacked to East and Northeast on 20 November 1944. Displaced to MAINVILLIERS, 2100 hours, direct support of 317th Inf. Occupied defensive positions to protect left flank of the Corps. 974th FA relieved from reinforcing mission. 1400 hours, 22 November 1944, displaced to CHARBONNAGES. Mission, general support. 317th Inf to Division reserve. Group WYETH formed for general support, consisting of 313th FA, 512th FA and 974th FA.

d. 26 November 1944, mission, direct support 317th Inf attacking to the East. 512th FA relieved from reinforcing mission. 974th FA reinforcing fires of the battalion. Preparation fired in support of the attack.

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(After Action Report, continued)

Displaced to LAUDERFANG at 1000 hours, 26 November 1944. This position in the MAGINOT LINE. 1100 hours, 27 November 1944, displaced to ROLSCHWILLER, continuing direct support of 317th Inf. 0800 hours, 28 November 1944, displaced to LACHEN and at 1530 hours, same date, displaced to SENGBUSCH. Enemy opposition increasing. Attack stopped at PFARREBACH. Enemy counter attacking with tanks and infantry.

e. 29 November 1944, 317th Infantry placed in Division reserve, 313th FA mission, general support. Defensive positions prepared and defensive fires planned and prepared. 30 November 1944, close of period of this report, battalion in position at SENGBUSCH under heavy artillery and mortar fire, and in general support.

2. SUMMARY

a. FDC - The lip microphone issued for use by computers, is not practical. Mainly because it impedes the speech of the computer in passing on data and information within FDC. The plug type earphones make it very difficult for the computer to hear sensings and fire commands and adds greatly to the possibility of error. Strongly recommend that the head and chest set be issued for use by computers. The use of a 10 drop German switchboard wired into the FDC telephones makes it possible for one telephone to handle all calls during lulls in activity and increases the flexibility of the system. The prompt identification of which telephone is ringing in a small, crowded CP tent is possible by the corresponding drop falling on the switchboard. Recapulation of Missions Fired is as follows:

Counter-Battery.....	11
Observation Posts.....	6
TOC Missions.....	21
Infantry.....	40
Tanks.....	15
Mortars.....	7
Machine Guns.....	12
Motor Vehicles.....	6
Command Posts.....	7
Ammunition Dump.....	1
Propaganda Leaflet Missions.....	12
Preparations.....	6
Barrage.....	3
Interdiction.....	96
Harrassing.....	23
Base point registration.....	36
Check point registration.....	10
Total Missions.....	<u>314</u>

Average number of rounds per mission, 27.7. Of total missions fired, 104, or 33%, were fired by the battalion. Of total missions fired, 18, or 6% were fired with time shell.

(After Action Report, continued)

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By COK DAKA Date 6.14.04

b. SURVEY - The 1/25,000 scale map continues to be excellent and supply plentiful.

c. COMMUNICATIONS -

1. Radio remains the primary means of communications with forward observers and liaison sections during fast moving operations. There has been a marked improvement in wire communications during the period, this due primarily, I think, to the realization by wire laying crews that wire must be placed overhead, buried, or well off road if it is to stay in service. Re-supply of wire not good during period. Recovery of wire unsatisfactory since rear elements get to it first. Much indiscriminate recovery of wire by units other than those putting it down.

2. Sufficient spare 610 radios should be on hand to replace at least 50% of those in operation. Each liaison section should have a minimum of two serviceable radios. This extra radio can be used as replacement for his or any forward observer set that goes out. Eliminates much of the time lost by sending back to battery or battalion for replacement. Spare batteries for 610 radio should be carried at all times.

3. Reinforcing artillery battalions should maintain at least one radio channel at their FDC on one of the reinforced artillery channels. This preferably on 608 radio. This is done by artillery battalions working in reinforcing roles with this battalion and has proven very satisfactory during displacements, and when wire goes out. This is in addition to the radio with the artillery Liaison Officer.

4. It has been found that forward observers from reinforcing artillery should have one channel tuned to appropriate fire control channel of reinforced battalion. This then affords him communication with the liaison officer with the Infantry Battalion Commander.

d. AIR OP - Bad weather during the period hampered the operation of the Air OP. A total of 35 missions were fired using Air OP. Missions as follows:

Registration.....	25
Vehicles.....	3
Infantry.....	3
Counterbattery.....	4

On two occasions, the Air OP by acting as radio relay station afforded the only means of communication with one Infantry unit well out in advance.

e. AMMUNITION - Supply plentiful within ration allowance. Mixed lot numbers continue to be the rule. Reports indicate a higher percentage of duds being fired, cause unknown. Ammunition was expended during the period as follows:



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Shell HE, Fuze L-48.....	6928 Rds.
Shell HE, Fuze L-54.....	1745 Rds.
Shell, Smoke, M.....	31 Rds.
Total Expenditure.....	8704 Rds.

F. MISCELLANEOUS -

1. German ammunition, if handled at all, should be handled with extreme care and by experienced personnel. One accident, costly in lives and property, occurred during period, while policing an area.

2. The supporting artillery for an active Infantry Regiment should be a group of three battalions, two light and one medium or minimum of two, one light and one medium. If at all practical, the two should work together throughout an operation, longer if possible. After working together, operation Staffs become acquainted and different SOPs better understood. Forward Observers get acquainted with Artillery Liaison Officers and Infantry Commanders and their methods of handling various situations. Positive procedure can be worked out for continuous close support of the infantry during displacement.

3. Replacement Officers especially in the grade of Second Lieutenant, are not too well trained, or definitely need refresher courses in conduct of fire prior to assignment to direct support artillery battalion. The requirement that he fire a "match box" problem daily or weekly is not sufficient. He should be given the opportunity to actually see the rounds land before he goes up to start shooting "for keeps".

4. Enlisted replacements are not being furnished promptly.

5. When the supported Infantry Regiment is placed in reserve, the direct support Artillery should also be placed in reserve and allowed to clean up.

  
JOHN W. BODDEN,  
Major, FA,  
S-3.

 SECRET

Authority 735017  
By CO SARA Date 6-14-04

HEADQUARTERS 313TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
APO #80, U. S. Army

5 December 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report for period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive. (Section II - Intelligence Operations).

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

1. The first seven days of this period were spent in defensive positions just west of the Seille River in the vicinity of Atton and Port-Sur-Seille. OPs were still located on St Genievieve Hill and Mousson Hill. It was necessary to continue use of these OPs even though they were well to the rear, because of the terrain which made occupation of OPs in the forward areas impossible. Observation was limited because of fog, but much valuable information was received. During this period, Forward OPs were manned by Forward Observer parties and supplemented the information gained by Battalion OPs.

2. On November 8, the division continued the attack in conjunction with other elements of the Third Army. Observation during the period of the advance and up to the last of the period covered by this report, observation was gained entirely by Forward Observers because of the terrain and the situation. During the last few days, Battalion OPs were again organized but visibility was very poor and little could be gained by their use.

3. The attack of the Division across the Seille and Nied Rivers were sucessful and the attack was continued to the vicinity of St Avold, Sengbusch, and Henriville, where defensive positions were organized to consolidate and prepare for the next phase of operations.

4. Codes used during this period were the same as used before. The same faults were observed with the Slidex Code. It takes too much time and Forward Observers cannot use it. A simple code is needed for their use.

5. Communications - Wire was used whenever possible but in the rapidly moving situations, radio is the primary means of communications. During this period, it was necessary for the Liaison Officers and Forward Observers to move cross country with the infantry. The 609 radio is excellent for communications except for the weight and the inability to transmit during movement. The radio carried, weighs 95 pounds which make a two man load necessary. To transmit, it is necessary to stop and set up the radio which wastes a good deal of time. Another fault, is the length of life of the BA39 and BA40 batteries. It is necessary to carry a supply which adds greatly to the weight of the equipment carried in the party. The In O and FO equipment should be as light as possible. The use of the jeeps to mount the equipment for the parties is out of the question now. Under present conditions, movement by foot is necessary in forward areas. It seems that a radio could be devised to contain the best features of the 600 series with the compactness and mobility of the 300 Series.

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Authority 73507  
By CO NARA Date 6-14-04

(After Action Report, continued)

6. During this period, the Division was in contact with elements of the following German Units:

17 SS Pa Gren Division  
48th Infantry Division  
36th V. G. Division  
2431st Fortress Battalion.

*John W. Bussey*

JOHN W. BUSSEY,  
Capt., PA,  
S-2.

[REDACTED]

Authority 735017  
By CD SARA Date 6.14.04

HEADQUARTERS 313TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
AFC #30, U. S. Army

5 December 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report for period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive. (Section III - Logistics, supply procedure, problems).

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels).

1. Class I Supply: Condiments are insufficient.
2. Class II Supply: Critical shortages have arisen in Trousers, wool, Shirts, wool, and raincoats.
3. Class III Supply: Division control of Class III is excellent.
4. Motor Supply: Satisfactory.
5. Class V Supply: Satisfactory.

*A. L. Sawano*

A. L. SAWANO  
Captain, FA,  
S-4.



Authority 735017  
By CO SARA Date 6-14-44

HEADQUARTERS 313TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
APO #80 U. S. Army

5 December 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report for period 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive. (Section IV - Personnel and Allied Administration).

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through channels).

1. Strength: The Battalion entered the period with the following strength:

	<u>T/O Authorization</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Over or Short</u>
Officers	34	32	-2
Warrant Officers	2	2	
Enlisted Men	473	479	+6

2. Casualties and Replacements for the period:

	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Officers</u>
Killed in action	6	0
Wounded in action	29	8
Missing in action	0	0
Disease or injury (non-battle)	18	1
Injured in action	3	0
Killed (non-battle)	11	1
Totals	67	10
Replacements received	6	3

3. Awards for the period:

	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Officers</u>
Silver Star	1	1
Air Medal		1
Oak Leaf Cluster to Purple Heart	2	
Purple Heart	14	8

4. Payment of Battalion: All Officers and enlisted men of the battalion were paid on 31 October 1944.

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Start Up ✓

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By CO NARA Date 6-14-04

(After Action Report, 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944 inclusive, Personnel and Allied Administration, continued)

5. Replacements: Requisitions for replacements have not been filled. The accepted explanation is that replacements are not available at Replacement Depots which supply this division.

*M. R. Callaway*  
M. R. CALLAWAY,  
WOJG, USA,  
Personnel Officer.

 [REDACTED]

Authority 735017  
By CO NARA Date 6-14-04

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HEADQUARTERS 313TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION  
APO #80, U. S. Army

5 December 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Report, 1 November 1944 to 30 November 1944.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Through Channels)

1. Concurrence in above sections as prepared by Staff Officers is made.

2. Operations during this period were difficult due to poor traffic conditions and inclement weather.

3. Registrations were difficult and this condition was somewhat overcome by taking one piece on all reconnaissance for new positions.

4. The use of additional artillery was facilitated by reducing the number of liaison officers on duty at Direct Support Battalion Headquarters and calling for fires through Group and/or Division Artillery Headquarters.

5. The organization was partially equipped with winter overshoes and additional clothing during this period and all materiel and vehicles were winterized.

6. During this period, also, rehabilitation of personnel and equipment was noticeable for the first week of operations.

7. Very few new methods were used but improvement in technique and planning was noticeable.

8. During the last ten days of period, due to short hours of daylight, more than one displacement per battery was impracticable but not impossible.

9. Approximately two hundred (200) miles of wire was laid and serviced during the month's operations by the battalion.

CLASSIFICATION

**CANCELLED**

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

*Murphy, Capt AD*

**DECLASSIFIED COMMITTEE 1 Oct 46**

*H. W. Ellery*  
H. W. ELLERY,  
Lt Col, FA  
Commanding

6 Incls

Incl 1 - After Action Report (Section I)

Incl 2 - After Action Report (Section II)

Incl 3 - After Action Report (Section III)

Incl 4 - After Action Report (Section IV)

Incl 5 - After Action Report (Unit Journal)

Incl 6 - 1 Folder; Operations Maps, Overlays

*Feb 5 1945*

*R. Gamma Colby / Reg 4117*