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80th
Infantry Division
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Blue
Ridge Summer 2005 - v86, #345 |
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THE NANCY
BRIDGEHEAD
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Foreword There are many missions suitable to the characteristics peculiar to the armored division. This action brings out several of these "typical suitable" missions and at least one that is not generally considered proper employment for armored. All of which may prove nothing at all, but does serve to give weight to the arguments advanced by some of the exponents of armor, that it can operate anywhere and perform any mission that other troops can. This particular action began with an attack on a narrow front to achieve a break-through to be followed by a period of exploitation (during part of which time the combat command operated while isolated behind German lines); then came an attack against enemy armor as a matter of self-preservation, an active defense of an area against superior forces, and finally a protracted period of dug in static defense. This last is one that an armored unit would rather not engage in, but is one that it can do if the necessity arises. Situation and
Mission, 12 September 1944 XII Corps Mission The 2nd Cavalry Group was to protect the south flank of the corps. The 35th Infantry Division was to advance through the FORET de HAYE, capture NANCY, and continue to the east in the direction of CHATEAU-SAI.INS. The 80th Infantry Division was to expand its shallow bridgehead over the MOSELLE RIVER at DIEULOUARD and continue to the east in the direction of DELME while covering the north flank of the corps from the strong German forces defending METZ, which was under attack by the XX Corps. The 79th Infantry Division was to move to the east in the direction of LUNEVILLE but was not scheduled for serious commitment in this attack. Not long after this action the 79 came under control of the Seventh Army and saw heavy fighting in the FORET de PARROY (due east of LUNEVILLE). The 4th Armored Division
was to by-pass NANCY in two columns to the north and south, seize the
high ground in the CHATEAU-SALINS area to block the exits from NANCY,
and be prepared to continue the advance across the SAAR RIVER in the vicinity
of SARREGUEMINES. The troop composition and order of march used on both the 13th and 14th was approximately as follows: Reconnaissance 37th Tank Battalion
Column 53rd Armored Infantry
Column The commanding Officer of the 166th Combat Engineer Battalion was placed in command of the 166th Engineer Column, which included a battalion of infantry from the 80th Infantry Division. This engineer officer had worked with the combat command before, and his capabilities were well known. The battalion of infantry was unknown to the combat command commander; hence the seemingly strange command setup. The main body of the command started its movement to the bridgehead at 0400 on the morning of the 13th. Soon thereafter the combat commander received word from Captain Trover that he had not been permitted to cross into the bridgehead during the night, and had planned to cross at 0600. But shortly after 0400, German force of infantry, reinforced with some light self-propelled guns, had launched an attack against the American Infantry holding the bridgehead and was driving it back toward the river. He would keep the combat commander informed of the situation in the bridgehead and would continue to press for permission to cross the river into the bridgehead as soon as possible, in order to get first hand information on the situation. The combat commander's reply was to approve this plan and to add that he would proceed at once to the bridge sites, where Captain Trover was to be prepared to report to him on request. The combat Commander then worked his way up the column, picking up on the way the commanding officer of the 37th tank Battalion, the leading battalion in column. These commanders reached the bridge shortly before 0700. At DIEULOUARD the MOSELLE has two channels and a barge canal running parallel to the river at that point. In the meantime, the main column continued its march and by 0700 had begun to pull off the road between GRISCOURT (west of DIEULOUARD) and DIEULOUARD to await clarification of the situation in the bridgehead and orders from the combat commander. Part of the artillery of the command went into firing positions just west of DIEULOUARD to support the crossing of the main column if it became necessary to fight in the bridgehead. At this point it may be well to briefly outline the organization of the staff functioning and chain of command as applied in Combat Command A. It had been found early in the campaign that, due to the swift movement of events, it was necessary to establish a division of responsibility and permit a latitude of decision to staff officers and subordinate commanders that at first glance appeared radical. On closer examination, however, the advantage of this system became apparent. It permitted the officer on the spot and in full knowledge of the situation to make a decision quickly and take action when it was most needed and when it would do the most good. This was the teamwork that resulted from training closely together and becoming fully acquainted with each other. Within the Combat Command I headquarters, the commander looked forward while the executive officer looked to the rear. The intelligence officer, S-2, worked directly under the operations officer, S-3, and both were directly responsible to the commander. Thus when the commander was forward along the column, he kept in direct communication with the S-3 and transmitted through him most tactical instructions to subordinate commanders. In some cases he gave orders direct to the subordinate commanders and notified the S-3 of his actions. When the instructions of the commander were general in nature the S-3 worked out the details to fit the situation and transmitted them to the units without further confirmation from the commander. The executive officer was responsible for the marching of the column, keeping it closed up or "coiled" off the road and dispersed when the head was halted or stopped, and for all the administrative work of the command, such as the general supervision. He kept in direct communication with the division headquarters, forwarding reports and receiving orders from the command, and in the absence of the commander became responsible for the tactical operation of the command. The Executive, S-3, and the S-2 were close together in the column, and during the course of every day consulted frequently. The supply officer, S-4, was in direct command of the trains, marched them at the rear of the combat column, and handled the general supervision of the attached units. In his column he had the service companies of units, the attached Maintenance Company, and as protection a platoon of antiaircraft artillery. He reported to and received his orders directly from the executive officer. The plans of all the staff sections were correlated at the start of each operation, and each night adjustments were made in the projected plans in accordance with results of the day's actions and the prospects for the following day. Subordinate commanders were allowed the greatest amount of responsibility. The commanders were given assignments and allowed to carry them out as the situation dictated. They were given a job to do and, knowing what was expected of them, they never hesitated doing what was necessary to get the job done, with no delay because of checking with the commander over details. Thus when word received that there was trouble in the bridgehead the combat commander was able to move immediately to the troubled spot without waiting to discuss the situation with his staff members or to give them instructions. The S-3 notified the units of the situation and instructed them to be prepared to fight in the bridgehead. The leading force would make the initial attack if required and would be supported by the next force in column if help should be needed. The division artillery commander moved the rear artillery elements forward and put them in position on the west side of the river to support the attack, leaving the forward battery free to follow immediately into the bridgehead for support there if need. As the head of the column approached DIEULOUARD without being able to cross as yet, the executive officer moved each succeeding element off the road into assembly areas to free the road and have the command gathered for any contingency. At the bridge site the situation was tense! By 0615 German infantry was fighting for control of the easternmost of the three bridges, and it appeared probable that the bridgehead would be lost. Under these conditions the corps officer at the bridge gave his reluctant consent for Captain Trover to take his troop into action. Already alert and ready to go, it moved at once. Attacking viciously across the bridges it drove the German infantry in flight across the valley and up the heights of ST E. GENEVIEVE and through the towns of LOISY and STE. GENEVIEVE. In the latter place the fighting was hot, and German self-propelled guns were met which outgunned the light armored cars of the cavalry. Captain Trover took cover with his troop on the reserve slope of the heights and reported to the combat commander that he would hold his ground until the main body came through. While this action was taking place a council of war was underway at the bridge. The combat commander and the commanding officer of the 37th Tank Battalion had arrived shortly after Captain Trover had initiated his attack and were soon joined by the commanding generals of the XII Corps, 4th Armored Division, and the 80th Infantry Division. The combat commander asked for and received permission to move on across the river and continue his mission. Accordingly, the 37th Tank Battalion column was ordered to attack at once clear the bridgehead, an assembly preparatory to continuing the advance toward CHATEAU-SALINS. At approximately 0800 the 37th Tank Battalion, reinforced with a company of infantry from the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, began crossing the bridges. Moving rapidly and deploying from march formation, this force stormed up the precipitous heights of STE. GENEVIEVE and soon had cleared all of the bridgehead area, which included the towns of STE. GENEVIEVE and BEZAUMONT in addition to LOISY, already cleared by the cavalry troop. During this action our troops were under constant fire from the German artillery and heavy mortars from the vicinity of PONT A MOUSSON to the north. There the ground was even higher than that at STE. GENEVIEVE. The German defenders had perfect observation on our attacking forces and continued to pour fire into the CCA column all during the day as it passed over the bridges and through the breach in the German lines. Assembling rapidly, the 37th prepared to launch its second attack of the day with BENICOURT as its objective. This town lay five kilometers to the northeast and on the main highway between PONT A MOUSSON and CHATEAU-SALINS. Its capture would clear the way for the continued advance toward the combat command objective, as well as threaten the German positions at PONT A MOUSSON. The 66th Armored Field Artillery Battalion had by now crossed into the bridgehead and was in position to support the attack on BENICOURT. The combat command had joined the 37tth commander, and the order to attack was given. This attack jumped of at about 1000, drove the Germans back through the woods to the east of STE. GENEVIEVE, and cleared the town of BENICOURT by noon. As this attack drove home, observers from the CP, which had moved to BEZAUMONT in the meantime, could clearly see columns of German troops leaving PONT A MOUSSON at a rapid rate. They left artillery behind to shell the bridgehead and fight a delaying action. Later, when the armored attack swung in another direction, the Germans returned to their positions at PONT A MOUSSON and launched several counterattacks from there against the infantry. With BENICOURT captured and the way now clear to continue the advance, the remainder of the column began to cross the river more rapidly. It was hindered but not stopped by the Germany artillery fire that from time to time damaged a light vehicle or one or the other of the bridges. But the column continued to move, putting into practice the axiom of General Patton, "The safest thing to do when under artillery fire is to keep advancing; the enemy seldom shortens his range." By 1300 the bulk of the combat elements were across the bridges and the order was given to the advance. By now the situation was vague, and knowledge of what might be expected as the advance continued was totally lacking. Accordingly, the combat commander went up in an artillery plane to conduct personal reconnaissance and to better control his column. As the forward elements of the main body neared NOMENY a force of German tanks of unknown strength was reported by a Cub liaison plane to be in the vicinity of LIXIERERS, about three kilometers to the south of the route of advance. The 37th Tank Battalion Commander detached his leading infantry-tank team to deal with this threat. With the remainder of his force he investigated NOMENY, found it to be heavily mined, by-passed it to the south, and returned to the highway about a kilometer to the east of the town. There the force was joined by the LIXIERERS force, which had found the reported tank threat to be the motor park of a German infantry unit, guarded with a few self-propelled gulls. About half of this material had been destroyed, and the rest had escaped to the south. The column was now "rolling"! It stormed through AULNOIS-SUR-SEIILE, scattering the personnel of a German regimental supply installation and seizing intact a valuable bridge over the SEILLE RIVER. A squad of engineers was left to guard the bridge temporally because the column was now in the PROVINCE of LORRAINE, where many of the population were sympathetic to the Nazi cause. As the column neared LEMONCOURT, German infantry, in considerable numbers, were surprised in a close formation. The tanks ran through and over them without stopping and with all guns firing. The terrified Germans attempted to hide in haystacks and farm buildings, but the incendiary bullets of the 50 caliber machine guns set these afire and sent the victims to a flaming death. Few if any of this force escaped, and almost none were taken prisoner. The column pressed on to FRESNES, from which a German replacement battalion fled toward CHATEAU-SALINS. Some who failed to escape hid in buildings of the town and were captured during the night while trying to escape. The high ground overlooking CHATEAU-SALINS from the west was reached at little past 1700. One of the few prisoners taken at LEMONCOURT was an SS colonel. His unsolicited comments as a result of watching the command move into position for the night is of interest. For the sake of accuracy, the official report of Lt. John H. Prisoner, in charge of the prisoner of war iteration team, is quoted: "This prisoner, an SS Colonel (Standardtenfuhrer Theodore Werner, possessor of the German Cross in Gold) who commanded a division in Russia for a period of over two years, is only a short time with the SS and while waiting in the POW enclosure for evacuation he watched our units move up and made the following remark: "having been a commander of Army units in Russia covering an area of approximately 1500 miles, I must admit that the American troops are not only equipped with the best material, but what strikes us especially is the excellent organizational under which these men function. I would be please to know the commander of this particular division, and I am sure that it must be part of General Patton's Third Army. General Patton is for the American Army, what Rommel stands for in the German Army, but to know the commander of this armored division would explain to me how this Army managed to achieve such a speed of advance which in many instances caught us unprepared". While the main body of the command was making this rapid advance, two light forces were performing valuable work on the flanks. As BENICOURT was cleared, Captain Trover moved D Troop through the town and to the north flank to protect the command from that direction. Much of the time moving across country he passed through CLEMERY (to the north of NOMENY), reduced defended roadblocks in ABOUCOURT, LETRICOURT, and CRAINCOURT, and passed on to DELME, where he found the town too strongly defended to be successfully attacked. From DELME he returned to the route of the main body at LEMONCOURT, where the direction of advance had turned sharply to the southeast. There he was placed for the night to protect the "elbow" on the route until the advance could continue the next day. When C Company of the 37th Tank Battalion had gone to LIXIERES to deal with the German motor park, it had been followed by D Company of the same battalion. His light tank company had been reinforced with the assault gun platoon of the battalion. From LIXIERES he had moved east on roads parallel to the route of advance till he reached the SEILLE RIVER. At three towns, bridges over the SEILLE had been blown, and the ground was too marshy to fording of the river feasible. Accordingly he returned to the axis of advance at AULNOIS and held that town and its valuable bridge until relieved by a platoon of Trovers troop about noon of the next day. The column closed slowly, and it was not until nearly daylight of the 14th that the last combat elements had taken their place on the perimeter of the bivouac area. The trains of the combat command did not reach STE. GENEVIEVE until nearly midnight. The combat commander flew the column once more just before dark and saw the last elements of the trains still on the West Side of the MOSELLE. Since they had very little protection with them and the route of the main body had taken several detours, it was decided to have them bivouac within the protection of the lines of the 80th Infantry Division until daylight. However, as the leading elements of the trains had become lost due to a break in the column and had moved down onto the plain east of STE. GENEVIEVE, the combat command S-4 and trains commander placed all his vehicles together in leaguer and fought off small German patrols throughout the night. The damage to the bridges previously mentioned and congestion in the bridgehead had broken the combat command column many times during the day and caused much nerve-racking delay. As customary, the artillery of the command was placed in position to fire around the entire 360 degrees of the compass. During the night harassing fire was placed on crossroads and towns, both close by and to the limit of the range of its guns. This helped materially in confusing the enemy as to the exact positions of the command and was one of the principal factors in the strength of its perimeter defense. It also restricted the use of the roads to the enemy and aided materially in concealing the probable direction of advance the following day, This practice of placing three battalions of artillery in position for all-round defense paid big dividends on this and the nights to follow. At daylight of a cold rainy day the trains were brought up and the command resupplied in readiness for further movement. During the night some artillery fire had been received from CHATEAU-SALINS and as that town was a rather large one decided to by-pass it in the movement toward ARRACOURT. Accordingly, at 1200 on the 14th the column struck straight south from its bivouac and moved by a woods trail, toward the town of CHAMBREY, which lay close by the main highway leading from NANCY to CHATEAU-SALINS. The combat commander again flew the column in a Cub plane during the advance and until the leading elements had taken ARRACOURT. Scattered German vehicles were met at CHAMBREY and destroyed. Turning east past VIC-SUR-SEILLE, which was by-passed, the column again turned south through ARRACOURT to VALHEY and then to EINVILLE and BAUZEMONT, on the RHINE-MARNE CANAL. At ARRACOURT and VALHEY the headquarters of the German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was overrun and most of its personnel captured or killed. At VALHEY the first CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL of HONOR to be won by a member of the division was Sergeant Sadowski when the column overran and destroyed a nest of eight 88mm antitank guns which were manned by former members of Rommel's Afrika Korps. The award was made posthumously. At RINVILLE and at BAUZEMONT the bridges over the canal were found blown, and the heads of the column swung back east to LEY, the easternmost part of the outpost system that night. By 1900 the entire command had closed in the ARRACOURT area and all units were disposed to carry out the assigned mission of exploitation: to block the roads east of NANCY to prevent the escape of the German defender of that city. On the first night dividends were taken! By daylight more than 300 prisoners had been captured, and many vehicles destroyed, and several German columns forced to retreat to try another way out of the trap. As the trains closed
on the night of the 12th a small task force consisting of one medium tank
company from the 35th Tank Battalion plus one infantry company from the
10th Armored Infantry Battalion joined the combat command. The division
commander had sent it to reinforced CCA on the mission of exploitation.
The commander of this force reported that there had been no sign of the
enemy along the route of advance. Because of this report and since it
was expected that friendly infantry units would follow up the advantage
gained by the break-through of the combat command D Troop was relieved
of its mission of guarding the supply route and ordered to move from positions
at LEMONCOURT and AUKNOIS to rejoin the main body in order it might conduct
reconnaissance to the east. D Troop had relieved D Company of the 37th
at AUKNOIS early on the 14th, and this light tank company had made up
the rear guard for the movement from FRESNES to ARRACOURT. Very early in the game it was learned that the only sure way to have supplies when you needed them on an operation of penetration or exploitation was to take then with you. Accordingly, the command had made a practice of carrying along every available truck loaded with supplies. Every kitchen truck was stripped of its mess equipment and loaded with gas or ammunition. Rations were carried on the combat vehicles. Every supply truck was loaded to more than 100% overload, and indeed some trucks carried as much as seven to eight tons of supplies. Whenever possible as it was in this case, an extra truck platoon from an attached truck company was attached to the trains. The trains were never left behind to be brought up later; they followed immediately behind the combat column and that they proved to be the safest place for them. They could follow along in the vacuum created by the shock of the combat column and be safety through the enemy resistance before it could recover. In the two days of this phase of operation, much had been learned. For the first time in its combat history the command had passed through the bridgehead of another unit. Always before it had established its on bridgeheads. On this occasion it was learned that to make an operation work smoothly it is necessary to have very close control by members of the command itself, at the bridge sites, and that all vehicles of the command must have priority over all other units until the crossing is completed. It was proved that any force passing through a bridgehead must be prepared to fight its way out if necessary, and to accomplish this it must be able to attack from march formations. The penetration of the command and its taking up position behind the German defenders had a decisive effect upon the operations in the NANCY area. Similar results, from similar operations, were to be gained many times in the future by this and other armored units in the closing phase of the war. It also soon became
apparent that to gain full benefit from armored thrusts, infantry must
follow up quickly to exploit the advantage before the enemy can recover. |
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