Blue Ridge
Official Publication of the
80th Division Veterans Asssociation, Inc.

Post Reunion 2005 - v86, #346

... continued from last issue

EXPLOITATION PHASE, 15-18 SEPTEMBER

The period of 15-18 September was devoted to a true operation of exploitation. Strong outposts were stationed on all main roads from CHAMBREY on the north to the RHINE-MARNE CANAL on the south. Raids hy small infantry-tank teams were made on towns to the east to the limit of Supporting artillery range. Reconnaissance was conducted by Troop D of the 25th Cavalry to a distance of approximately 15 kilometers to the east of MOYENVIC-BOURDONNAY highway. In addition to this, a perimeter defense was maintained on the high ground surrounding ARRACOU RT on the south, east, and north.

On 15 September there was no heavy fighting, hut large numbers of prisoners were taken and much enemy material was destroyed. At 1130 word was received from division headquarters that the 80th Infantry Division was receiving a heavy counter-attack near STE. GENEVIEVE and that the 1st Battalion of the 318th Infantry was to he returned to the 80th Division at once. It was further ordered that this infantry battalion he escorted by at least one company of medium tanks. At about 1500 the battalion started on its return to the STE. GENEVIEVE escorted by Company C of the 35th lank Battalion. The operations officer of the 35th tank Battalion was placed in command of this entire force for the return movement. The empty trains of the combat command, carrying approximately 600 prisoners of war, accompanied this task force. Adjustments were made in the perimeter defense to compensate for the loss of infantry battalion and the Tank Company.

At 1800 word was received from this departing force that it had encountered enemy tanks near NOMENY and had suffered some damage. It planned to attack west in the direction of STE. GEVEVIEVE. Shortly thereafter radio contact was lost, nothing further being heard from the force until nearly 1200 on the 16th.

About 1200 on the 16th, Captain Strong, who had commanded the column of command trains accompanying this task force, returned to the bivouac area at ARRACOURT with his trains intact and carrying nearly 100 more prisoners than had departed with the day before. Escorting him was a platoon of Reconnaissance Troop of the 80th Infantry Division. This platoon had been cut off by the enemy near AULNOIS and had joined the task force late the afternoon before.

Captain Strong brought word that the task force had encountered the rear elements of the German force attacking STE. GENEVIEVE. The fight had begun shortly after 1800 of the previous afternoon and had continued through most of the night with each side attacking and, in return, receiving counter-attacks. Just before daylight the task force commander reached the decision that the trains seriously hampered his chances of fighting through the German lines without suffering excessive losses. He accordingly ordered them to return to the bivouac area at ARRACOURT and gave them the reconnaissance platoon, previously mentioned, as an escort. He had expected to attack toward STE. GENEVIEVE at daylight.

At about 1300 word was received from Headquarters 4th Armored Division that the attack of the task force had been successful and that it had retaken STE. GENEVIEVE with heavy casualties to the enemy, while suffering only light losses itself. For the second time in three days a force from the combat command had taken STE. GENEVIEVE from a determined enemy. After assisting the 80th Division in an attack toward PONT-A-MOUSSON, Company C of the 35th returned to its battalion in the vicinity of LUNVILLE, traveling a circuitous route to the west of NANCY to do so.

In the meantime Combat Command B was meeting determined resistance in its efforts to cross the RHINE-MARNE CANAL in the vicinity of MAIXE and SOMMERVILLEER, which is about 6 miles southwest of MAIXE. Accordingly, division headquarters ordered the CC Attack to clear the north bank of the canal to assist CC B in its crossing. At 90500 a task force of tanks, infantry, and artillery moved west to accomplish this mission. After clearing the woods west of EINVILLE and the towns of SERRES, HOEVILLE, DROUVILLE, and COURBESSEAUX, contact was made with CC B's 8th Tank Battalion west of DROUVILLE at HARRUCOURT late in the morning. This sweep had broken the German defense, causing the defenders to retreat to the north and west. Addition contact was made with elements of CC B at MAIXE. By 1300 this mission was complete and the task force returned to its original position. CC B crossed the rear of CCA moving to the north and took up position in the vicinity of FRESNES, on the high ground west of CHATEAU-SALINS.

From approximately 1600 on the afternoon of the 14th until CC B had completed clearing the area to the west of CC A, the command had been isolated. During this 48-hour period, 1614 prisoners of war had accumulated in the combat command PW cage. In addition to the requirement of guarding this number of prisoners, the additional problem of feeding and providing medical care for the numerous wounded became acute. Included in this bag of prisoners was one entire German field hospital with nearly 400 patients. The field hospital had been captured by the combat command surgeon late on the afternoon of the t 5th, with a scalpel late on the afternoon of the 15th, with a scalpel as his major piece of armament. When he first observed, it had been attempting to escape with all wounded in ambulances. What seems at first amusing might have been disastrous to the surgeon in view of the large quantity of small arms and hand grenades which were discovered when the ambulances and personnel were search after reaching the PW cage.

17 September was uneventful except for receipt of a warning order from division that the command was to move in the direction of SARREGUEMINES early on 19 September.

When CC B had moved to FRESNES on 18 September, the reserve command of the division had occupied I.UNEVII,LE after the 2d Cavalry Group had received a severe mauling at the hands of the German 11th Panzer Division in the FORET DE PARROY. Now the reserve command was under heavy fire heavy fire from the same famous German division, and it appeared that an assault by that division was imminent. At 1200 the command was ordered to reinforce the reserve command with a minimum force of one medium Tank Company, one field Artillery battalion, and one platoon of tank destroyers. A force of this composition under the command of the executive officer of the 37th Tank Battalion began moving to LUNEVILLE at 1300.

At 1500 the entire command was alerted for possible movement to the south to repel the German attack expected in the LUNEVILLE area, should it develop. The 25 Cavalry Squadron would be attached to CC A and would arrive during the night to screen to the south and southeast. The German attack did not materialize, and the command settled down for the night shortly after dark. At 2300 the 37th Tank Battalion reported hearing an unidentified armored column approaching its position from the direction of BOURDONNAY and pulling off the road approximately a mile to the south of the outpost. Soon this column was identified as enemy and dispersed with artillery fire.

Shortly before midnight the 166th Combat Engineer Battalion moved into their bivouac area and was attached to the command.

DISCUSSION
The four days of this particular phase of the operation can be truthfully called a typical operation of exploitation. It was typified by constant movement within the enemy line by constant movement within the enemy line and the use of fast-moving, aggressive task forces operating from a secure and easily defended base. Isolation for a 48-hour period caused no concern to any member of he command: rather it spurred them to greater alertness and activity. The flexibility of armor was typified in the ability of the command to shift the composition of its task force or combat teams to meet such changing situations as the necessity to assist other friendly elements. Examples of this were the movement of the one such force to STE. GENEVIEVE, another force to LUNEVILLE, and the sweep to the west by a third. Concurrently with these activities, plans were being made to continue the advance to the northeast and preliminary reconnaissance was made toward that end.

To illustrate the comparative damage that can he inflicted upon an enemy in such a situation, the losses suffered by the Germans during these four days included 1070 killed or captured. 16 large caliber guns destroyed, 8 tanks destroyed, and 232 miscellaneous vehicles destroyed. In contrast the total casualties of the combat command during these same four days were 3 killed, 15 wounded, and four tanks knocked out.

next issue: DEFENSIVE PHASE, 19-26 September