HEADQUARTERS 318TH INFANTRY APO 80, U.S.ARMY

7 December 1944

AFTER ACTION REPORT

MONTH OF NOVEMBER

The principle problem during the entire month was the displacement of trains. Due to the inclement weather and the necessity of having hard standing for vehicles and shelter for our operations (breakdowns and office work, etc.), it is vitally necessary to obtain shelter during this time of year. If the activities of trains is not confined to firm roads, operations bog down, and the supply cannot back up the organization's effort. Due to the continued large concentration of supporting troops in our sector all of the villages were overcrowded, and the difficulty of finding room for the trains, whose priority of movement is low, were very great. To help solve this problem, the trains of battalions were released to Bn control, and they supported their units closely and all from different locations. This divided the regimental trains into several echelons and did not require a complete village for billeting. Despite this, however, the installations of Service Company are still so large and interdependant that it takes considerable room.

During the entire month we were repeatedly crowded by the rear elements of Division and higher echelon, who were making such a frenzied effort to "closely" support the fighting echelons that we were continually denied our logical train bivouses from which to adequatly support our own troops. Many times we found ourselves behind the service elements of Division, because they had usurped our logical locations. Therefore we were continually crowded out between the rear service elements and the fighting echelons.

The result in many instances was the oversextention of our supply lines. And, more harrassing was the necessity of jumping about the countryside as soon as a spot became available before somebody else "scooped" the vacated location. This resulted in impeding our work, because each time a service echelon moves, it must cease its function and the disruption of its activity results in the loss of one or two days work. For that reason it is desirable to make long moves and less moves.

We continually brought these facts to the attention of the Division G-4, but we received no cooperation in its solution. We recommended Division control of movement of service echelons, but G-4 dismissed the subject.



The supply lines to service elements of higher echelon continually varied during the month. Sometimes these units were in front of us and sometimes so far to the rear that we were incommoded. In some instances the ASPs were 45 to 50 miles in rear of our service

trains. Generally the service on the part of these ASPs was very good however, and at no time was our ammunition supply unassured. Excellent roads helped immensely in resupply, and minimized the

effect of distance.

We employed the " B " ration as much as possible, and in most cases at least one hot meal per day has been fed. Two hot meals per day are fed very often to the fighting echelon, however, the time lag necessary in changing over from an operational to a "3" ration is still four (4) days and precludes the feeding of some hot meals when the situation changes abruptly and affords the opportunity of feeding hot meals. Regt Hors Co, Service Co, and Collecting Co B are the only three units who can continually serve hot meals. We issue the "B" ration to these units continually and use this combined ration as an emergency issue for a combat echelon which suddenly finds itself in a situation where it can feed hot meals and does not have sufficient "B" ration on hand. This permits an emergency issue of " B " rations on hand each day the amount of about 400 rations. Of course, each Bn carries a reserve of "B" on its train totaling at least one days ration but, when forced to consume an operational ration when in a rest situation, we try to supplement their ration with those Bs which we take away from Regt Hora Co. Service Co and Collecting Co B.

Appended to this report is a letter, this Headquarters, dated 29 November, which concisely states the remainder of the status of rations.

Losses of equipment, especially ordnance equipment were fairly heavy this month, but replacement was excellent and no unit suffered from lack of equipment. A list of critical major items is:

Belts, B.A.R. Generators for field ranges Rammer staff, for 57mm

Bore brushes, 57mm Tubes, 600 x 16 and 750 x 20

Tires have been coming through but not in sufficient quantity to support our needs.

Most of these items have been obtained at this date, except the staffs and brushes for the 57mm guns.

A great deal of pressure was applied to step up the salvage program and each ten days a list has been sent to Division which, we believe, vouches for the system being employed. The plan requires continous action both during and after combat by teams in each sector. From this salvage we have been able to fill a large part of our requisitions for weapons and individual equipment. We continue to "evacuate forward" all items which are needed and recovered from the battlefield.



It was found that considerable property was being abandoned by the troops in the villages where they had been billeted or assembled. This matter was brought to the attention of the combat commanders, and efforts made to correct this condition.

An individual from the Bn is assigned to the Bn's aid station and his sole function is to recover from casualties, such items of individual equipment as Binoculars, pistols and watches. Personnel from RSO continually check the collecting company for these items also. This system has been in effect for about twenty five days and so far the yield has been very small

During this month we drew about 75% issue on sleeping bags (GI) and high neck sweaters. We drew about a 90% issue of combat boots for EM at 1 pair per man and a complete issue of overshoes.

On 14 November we started to draw socks on a new plan. Based on ration strength we drew complete issue of 1 pair per man per day for 5 days. Each day the socks are issued with the rations and each day the individual has been required to run in one pair of dirty socks for laundering. On the sixth day of the plan we received the laundered socks in return. This meant a fresh pair of socks per man per day. All personnel questioned heartily endorsed the plan....but the men just won't turn in their socks. Supply sergeants who were questioned claim that in some cases it is necessary to force the man to surrender his socks. Cooperation on the part of the combat echelons has precluded 100% success to this plan despite several recommendations to the intermediate commanders. Examples: Quote field messages to all intermediate commanders, dated 26 November 1944.

"Your Bn turning in almost __ 5 of socks for laundering. CG desires 100% cooperation on sock rotation plan. Recommend command responsibilty be enforced."

Appended is also an informal memo on socks sent to each intermediate commander of this command.

To our Knowledge there was not employment of captured material with the exception of some 80mm mortars being used by the 3rd AN.

E. V. LeBLANG Major, 318th Inf



29 November 1944

SUBJECT: Rations.

TO : Commanding General, 80th Inf Div.

- 1. Submit the following for your information.
- 2. Upon investigation, the following information on "C" and "B" rations was ascertained:
 - a. An estimated 30 to 50% of "G" rations issued are wasted. After the majority of soldiers have subsisted on "C" rations for several days they will not est the Meat and Vegetable Hash or Meat and Vegetable Stew component. and they subsist almost entirely on the biscuit and beverage component. Prevelant reasons given for this condition are: (A) they are indigestible and cause heartburn: (B) they are unpalatable.
 - b. Approximately 70% of the "d" rations issued are the new type and the reaction is the same to this type as to the old type. A small percentage of the old type being received is found to be wouldy when they are opened.
 - c. On 24 November 1944, He Co 2nd Bn in DORVILLE, FRANCE, was issued "C" rations which the men refused to accept, stating that they would not eat them. There was no use in delivering the rations as they would be wasted. These rations were taken back and placed on the kitchen truck and reissued the following day. The men consumed about 30% of the issue.
 - d. This unit. as a result of repeated complaints about the "d" rations, requests only "k" and "lo-1" for operational rations. However, 50% of the requirement of "k" is issued in "d", which we are required to accept.
 - e. An overwhelming majority of the men prefer the "K" ration. They not only afford variety and palatability, but are easily digested. And, moreover, it is more convenient to carry three flat boxes of "K" rations than six cans of "C" rations.
 - f. The Meat and Vegetable Stew and the Corn Beef Hash components of the "B" ration have proven very unsatisfactory. Inspection of kitchens in this organization revealed that approximately 2/3 of the amount of these components issued is not consumed. At the present time our kitchens are carrying a large accumulation of this stock. Interviews with

uthoutly WWW 577637

f. Cont.
mess sergeants revealed that the men have the same reaction
to this food even when served hot that they do to the similar components in the "C" ration. A large percentage of
soldiers stated that they would rather eat a "10-1"
ration than the "B" ration when it contained these components. Otherwise the "B" ration is good.

3. Recommend that the issue of "C" rations be decreased in favor of "K" rations and that the Stew and Hash components be eliminated from the "B" ration.

L. MeVICKAR Col., 318th Inf Commanding

REGIMENTAL SUPPLY OFFICE 318TH INFANTRY - APO 80 PRANCE

24 November 1944

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM ON SOCKS

1-300

Effective on or about the 12th of November and thru the 17th of November inclusive Quartermaster issued automatically one pair of socks per man based on ration strength.

The first two days of this operation the units were in ignorance of the requirements of Circular 76 which specified the manner of turn in and reissue. This Circular reached us on the third day of the operation. Consequently, up to this time socks were turned in in bulk.

The following amounts of socks were turned in by this organization for washing and replacement on dates specified:

16 Nov - 1200

17 Nov - 1581

18 Nov - C

19 Nov - 908

20 Nov - 570

21 Nov - 479

22 Nov - 155

23 Nov - 53

The following breakdown for the dates specified indicates the turn-in by the units of this organization:

Unit	Date of Turn-in	Date of Re-issue	Amount
1st Bn	11-16-44	11-19-44	579
2nd Bn	11-16-44	11-19-44	311
3rd Bn	11-16-44	11-19-44	310
1st Bn	11-17-44	11-19-44	307
2nd Bn	11-17-44	11-19-44	493
3rd Pn	11-17-44	11-19-44	376
Anti-Tank Co		11-19-44	127
Cannon Co	11-17-44	11-19-44	98
Med Det	11-17-44	11-19-44	103
Service Co	11-17-44	11-19-44	77
2nd Bn	11-19-44	11-21-44	353
Regt Hq Co	11-19-44	11-21-44	200
Anti-Tank Co	11-19-44	11-21-44	130
Cannon Co	11-19-44	11-21-44	125
Med Det	11-19-44	11-21-44	100
2nd Bn	11-20-44	11-22-44	570
1st Bn	11-21-44	11-23-44	195
Anti-Tank Co	11-21-44	not recd.	111
Cannon Co	11-21-44	not reed.	73
Med Det	11-21-44	not recd.	100
Anti-Tank Co		not recd.	59
20.0	11-22-44	not recd.	96
Cannon Co	11-23-44	not recd.	53

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Med Det	11-21-44	not recd.	100
Anti-Tank Co		not recd.	59
A	77 -00-14	not reed.	96
Cannon Co	11-23-44	not recd.	53

On personally spot checking in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions we have found that each individual we interrogated had a pair of socks on his feet and a pair in his pocket. These men stated both pairs were fresh.

E. V. LeBLANC Major, Inf 3-4

Far B - After Action Report for North of November

Strongth - Commissioned and Enlisted

1.	at beginning	of peri	.021	233	4	T16
2.	Het ingresse				400	410
3.	Replacomento			46		1066
4.	Hot decrease			12		415
5.	Total losson			58		1481
	Strongth at			242	4	5701

Far G - Source of Replacements for Ferial

71st Replacement Estation 17th Replacement Depot 38th Replacement Estation