## HEADQUARTERS 80TH INFANTRY DIVISION Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 APO #80, U.S. Army

6 October 1944

Operations of Enemy in Sector of 80th Infantry Division on Attack on Moselle River 4 to 15 September 1944.

- 1. Time of receipt of mission from XII Corps: 042100B September 1944.
- 2. Mission (EEI's) received from XII Corps:
  - Determine strength NANCI defenses, personnel, fortifications.
- b. Determine composition, strength, location, and direction of movement of energy forces in and toward zone of advance of the Corps.
- c. Determine location extent and type enemy fortifications, defensive works, obstacles, road blocks, mined or demolitioned areas between PONT A MOUSSON (VOS99) glong MOSELLE \* WEURTHE Rivers.
- d. Determine condition roads, bridges and possible fords across MOSELLE MEURITHE Rivers.
- 3. a. G-2 Estimate of enemy situation: Enemy has only scattered groups W of MOSELIE River; all withdrawing to E and NE, burning some towns as they withdraw. Enemy digging in along E bank MOSELIE River in Division sector. Arty in unknown quantity with OP's on high ground, E of MOSELIE River. Elms of 3rd and 15th Panzer Grengdier Divisions withdrawing to E in Div. sector.
- b. Information received from KII Corps: Enery continues flight to NE and E. Increased number small centers of resistence felt at PONT A MOUSSON, TOUL, VITERNE, BAINVILLE SUR MADON, and at CHAUDENEY. It is believed that 16th Inf Div. is withdrawing to NE from SN FRANCE; leading Elms of this Div. may make their appearance at any time on the Corps S flank.

## 4. EEI's for Regta:

Supplied to

- a. Determine location, strength and composition of every defensive position.
- b. Determine location, strength, and identification of enemy Trs in or moving within or into Div Z.
  - c. Determine indications of hostile withdrawl.
  - 5. Enemy locations and type resistance expected:
- a. Artillery: Caly a few artillery pieces and self propelled guas expected. These pieces would wait until our Roa Elms approached, fire, and then withdraw.

- b. <u>Small grass</u> No small arms fire was expected W of MOSELIE R. Enemy Tra were Rptd to be digging in on E bank MOSELIE R exact positions unknown.
- c. Strong points: Here expected at PCNT A MOUSSON, TOUL, NANCY, and FORET DE HAME.

## 6. Amount of Resistance Found:

- a. Artillery: None W of MCSELIE R. In support of river defenses on E bank were Elms of 1553d Arty Regt and 3d Pz Atty Regt. These units had excellent OP's on kills at MCUSSON, STE GENEVIEVE, and CUSTINES, and fired accurate, observed fire on our Trs attempting to cross and latter crossing the river. The enemy held on to Arty OP's as long as possible.
- b. Small arms (Infantry): The enemy had AW between the canal and the river, on the E bank of the river, and on all approaches to the commanding ground. These weapons were sighted with excellent fields of fire, making approach in daylight almost impossible.
- c. Air: The enemy used very little air on only two or three days in the entire period were any enemy planes over the area, and in these cases the planes appeared two or three at a time. Missions were strafing; no bombs were dropped.
- d. Armor: Played no part in the primary defense of the river, however, from the second morning on, the enemy launched a series of powerful counterattacks, supported in every case with tanks. The number of tanks in each attack varied from 5 (for most attacks), to a definite armored thrust of 33 tanks on 13 September. In all cases the tanks were destroyed or driven back without reaching the bridge sites.

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